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INTRODUCTION 
Assume the following facts: During 2006, a state public pension fund 
invests $1.3 billion in securities issued by three special purpose vehicles.  
The securities are all rated AAA (the highest rating possible) by Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch at the time of the investment.  
Because of the nature of the securities (mortgage backed collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs)) and the fact that the pension fund has no access to 
information about the underlying assets, it is unable to judge independently 
the risk involved.  Instead, the pension fund relies wholly on the ratings 
provided by the credit rating agencies (CRAs) and on representations made 
in the offering materials put together by the issuer and the CRAs.  
Unfortunately, the pension fund does not know that the underlying assets 
consist entirely of risky subprime mortgages held as mortgage-backed 
securities.  Additionally, the pension fund does not know the role that the 
CRAs played in creating the complex derivative securities or that the CRAs 
were paid $1 million for rating them only if the issue was successfully 
marketed.  Further, the pension fund is not aware that the mathematical 
models used to generate the ratings were based on unrealistic assumptions 
about the housing market and that these models were not changed as the 
housing market began to deteriorate.  By contrast, the CRAs do know that 
their models were inadequate, that their ratings were misleading, and that 
they had too few trained personnel to perform the rating analysis.  In 
addition, when these flawed models did not provide the high ratings 
desired, the CRAs lowered their standards and continued to enter data until 
they were able to assign the AAA rating sought by the issuer.  As the 
housing market was thrown into turmoil, the CRAs assured investors that 
the securities would weather the crisis.  Based on the guarantees of the 
rating agencies, investors continue to hold onto these securities.  All three 
investments fail and the pension fund loses its total investment of $3.1 
billion. 
 
This scenario is not fiction.  It is based on the allegations made by the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System against Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch.
1
  This was not an isolated incident.  Rating 
structured financial offerings like the CDOs outlined above was lucrative 
for CRAs.  By 2007, structured finance accounted for fifty-three percent of 
Moody’s total revenues; revenues from structured finance grew 800% for 
Standard & Poor’s from 2002 to 2006; Fitch’s profits were up twenty-two 
 
 1.  Complaint, Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., No. CGC-
09-490241 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 9, 2009)[hereinafter CalPers Complaint]. 
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percent in 2007.
2
  Because the potential profits were so great, the pressures 
to create and rate these issues highly were immense.  CRAs continued to 
rate structured finance without written procedures, without rationale for 
deviations from their models, and without policies to address the known 
deficiencies in their models. 
Because borrowers inevitably know more about their business 
operations and the risks involved in investing than investors, there is a 
situation of asymmetric information,
3
 which could hinder the efficient 
allocation of capital throughout the economy.  Economists have long 
recognized that because of these information asymmetries, intermediaries 
are necessary to ensure a smooth flow of credit throughout the economy.
4
  
CRAs fulfill this role.  In theory, CRAs act as neutral third parties 
providing unbiased information with respect to the creditworthiness of 
investments offered.
5
  They serve as gatekeepers, protecting both public 
 
 2.  CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 43-46.   
 3.  See generally George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970) (giving examples of some of the effects of 
asymmetric information); Stephane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit 
Rating Agencies:  The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L.J. 617, 622 
(2006) (“Inevitably, information asymmetry exists in the debt market because issuers have 
superior information regarding their creditworthiness than do investors.”); Lawrence J. 
White, Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis:  Less Regulation of CRAs is a 
Better Response, 25 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 170, 174 (2010) (“The critical problem is 
one of asymmetric information:  The borrower usually knows more about the prospects for 
repayment than does the lender.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law 
and Economics of Regulating Ratings Firms, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 49, 76 (2007) 
(“[I]nformation asymmetries between buyers and sellers created an opening for independent 
rating firms.”); Theresa Nagy, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying 
Constitutional Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
140, 143 (2009) (“Rating agencies emerged in the financial market at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, likely to help level the information imbalance that inherently exits in 
lending relationships.”); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?:  Two 
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 632 (1999) (“Rating 
agencies may exist because of information asymmetry between debt issuers and investors.”); 
Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 2 (U. 
San Diego, Research Paper No. 09-015, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1430653 (“In financial markets, to the extent that sellers cannot credibly make 
such disclosures, there are incentives for information intermediaries to play this role.”); 
White, supra note 3, at 5 (“Credit rating agencies are one potential source of help for 
piercing the fog of asymmetrical information . . . .”).   
 5.  See Joshua D. Krebs, The Rating Agencies:  Where We Have Been and Where Do 
We Go From Here?, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 133, 134 (2009) (“The function of 
these reputational intermediaries is to act as neutral third party advisors to the investment 
process.”); see also Sulette Lombard, Credit Rating Agencies as Gatekeepers:  What Went 
Wrong? (2009), at 2, available at http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference 
2009/LombardCLTA09.pdf (“The function of credit rating agencies is to ‘rate’ investment 
and credit instruments to make it easier for non-specialist investors to determine the risk 
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and individual investors.  CRAs have an important quasi-public function
6
 
to perform within the economy.  They fulfill this obligation, however, only 
if the ratings they assign are accurate.  Unfortunately, they failed to fulfill 
this obligation in the years prior to the global financial crisis (GFC).  By 
inaccurately rating the CDOs and other complex derivatives largely backed 
by subprime mortgages, they created a market for those securities.
7
  This 
provided incentives for mortgagors to issue increasingly risky home 
mortgages and to create increasingly risky CDOs, both of which fueled the 
bubble that eventually led to the GFC.
8
  CRA analysis and rating of these 
CDOs could, and should have, prevented the bubble from expanding.  
Unfortunately, the riskiness of the mortgages and mortgage tranches on 
which the CDOs were written was not accurately reflected in the credit 
ratings assigned.  Using inadequate models, fed with insufficient data, and 
motivated by the payments received from the issuers, CRAs evaluated the 
securities and assigned them unjustifiably high ratings.
9
 
The scenario outlined above illustrates the questions considered in this 
article.  CRAs were instrumental in allowing the GFC to develop.  Their 
ratings fueled demand for more structured financial products and put 
 
inherent to particular investments.”).  A credit rating agency is defined to be a person (a) 
engaged in the business of issuing credit ratings on the Internet or through another readily 
accessible means, for free or for a reasonable fee, but does not include a commercial credit 
reporting company; (b) employing either a quantitative or qualitative model, or both, to 
determine credit ratings; and (c) receiving fees from either issuers, investors, or other 
market participants, or a combination thereof.  Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No.109-291, 120 STAT. 1328, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3(a)(61). 
 6.  See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Credit Rating Agencies, Structured Securities, and the 
Way out of the Abyss, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 639, 654 (2009) (“The criteria developed 
and operationalized by rating agencies influence the level of activity of the finance markets, 
the allocation of capital, as well as the cost of credit.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private 
Ordering of Public Markets:  The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) 
(“The existence and almost universal acceptance of ratings make it much easier for investors 
in the capital markets to assess the creditworthiness of a given issuance of securities.  In this 
sense, ratings can be thought of as a public good.”).   
 7.  See Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game:  Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the 
Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1118 (2009) (noting that 
“Fitch, Moody’s and S&P . . . played a substantial role in the development of the market for 
mortgage backed securities.”); David J. Matthews, Ruined in a Conventional Way:  
Responses to Credit Ratings’ Role in Credit Crises, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 245, 252 
(2009) (“High ratings for senior tranches allowed many RMBS issuances to be originated at 
lower interest rates than would have been possible had lenders used only traditional debt 
financing. These factors forced origination standards down as the pool of qualified 
borrowers shrank.”). 
 8.  See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction – Structured Finance and Credit 
Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 54 (2009) (explaining how 
financial bubbles are generated both generally and with respect to the subprime housing 
market).  
 9.  Id.   
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pressure on mortgage originators to issue increasingly risky mortgages.  
When the housing market crashed, the impacts were felt worldwide.  Why 
was this allowed to happen?  Where were the regulators?  What recourse do 
investors have?  The answers, as we will discuss, are that CRAs are subject 
to little administrative oversight, they were expressly excluded from 
Section 11 liability under the 1933 Securities Act, and they were largely 
immune from civil liability based on negligence or fraud. 
In the aftermath of the GFC, much attention has been paid to 
identifying its causes.  Policy-makers have attempted to formulate policy 
designed to regulate the conduct of the players in the financial markets in 
order to prevent future crises.  One such attempt was the enactment of The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank).
10
  With respect to CRAs, the reforms of Dodd-Frank have been 
criticized as inadequate.  Previous work has examined the provisions of 
Dodd-Frank meant to address the conflicts of interest created by the issuer-
pays model and found those provisions to be lacking.
11
 Further, while many 
have argued that CRAs should be subject to civil liability—much like other 
financial professionals
12
—there have been problems implementing these 
provisions.  This scenario provides an opportunity to explore another 
alternative—imposing criminal liability upon corporations for conduct such 
as that exhibited by CRAs prior to the GFC. 
Criminal liability has always served both as an alternative and a 
supplement to civil liability.  The mens rea requirement of criminal law,
13
 
 
 10.  Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
111-203, § 2, 124 Stat. 1376, 1386 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
 11.  See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild & Frank D’Souza, Conflicts of Interest in 
the Credit Ratings Industry after Dodd-Frank:  Continued Business as Usual?, 7 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 1 (2012) (explaining that under the issuer pays model, CRAs are paid by the 
issuer of the securities that they are rating); Deryn Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the 
Credit Crisis:  How the “Issuer Pays” Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do 
About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 605, 622 (2009)(discussing the “issuer pays” model 
and its risks); Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted:  Credit Rating 
Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 239-40 
(2009)(discussing CRA’s transition from a “subscriber pays” revenue model to an “issuer 
pays” model).  
 12.  See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild & Frank D’Souza, Is Imposing Liability 
on Credit Rating Agencies a Good Idea?:  Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of 
the Global Financial Crisis, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 175, 177 (2012) (discussing the 
“potential for civil liability stemming from the GFC, based upon both common law and 
statutory liability.”). 
 13.  H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 187 (1968) (“In all advanced legal 
systems liability to conviction for serious crimes is made dependent, not only on the 
offender having done those outward acts which the law forbids, but on his having done them 
in a certain frame of mind or with a certain will.”).  The intent requirement is referred to as 
mens rea.  
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however, has traditionally imposed barriers in terms of attaching criminal 
liability to corporations.  In this article, we consider whether attaching 
criminal liability to CRAs would serve valid public policy objectives and 
how the intent requirement can be met.  Specifically, in Part I we outline 
the different philosophies and objectives of criminal and civil liability.  We 
highlight the objectives of deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation as 
hallmarks of criminal law.  Much recent scholarly attention has focused on 
the pragmatic difficulties of imposing sanctions upon corporations found 
guilty of criminal behavior.
14
  We intend, however, to consider the 
philosophical appropriateness of imposing criminal liability upon a 
corporation.  In doing so, we first outline the literature considering 
application of criminal liability to corporations.  This section will focus on 
the barriers created by the intent, or mens rea, requirement and the various 
models adopted by the courts and advanced by legal scholars to meet the 
mens rea requirement in the context of corporate crime.  In this part, we 
outline the traditional model of respondeat superior and argue that it is 
inadequate because it fails to consider the role that corporate culture plays 
in encouraging crime by corporate employees.
15
  We conclude Part I by 
outlining the corporate ethos model as a useful alternative.  The corporate 
ethos model is based on the belief that “organizations possess an identity 
that is independent of specific individuals who control or work for the 
organization,”
16
 and corporate criminal liability is appropriate if the 
government can prove that the corporate ethos encouraged corporate 
employees to engage in wrongdoing.  In Part II we turn our attention to the 
role that CRAs played in the GFC, paying particular attention to rewards 
and incentives that might have encouraged misconduct.  In this part we will 
outline the lack of meaningful regulation of CRAs, including the relevant 
sections of Dodd-Frank, and the limits of civil liability.  Finally, in Part III 
 
 14.   See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., “No Soul to Damn:  No Body to Kick”:  An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386-
87 (1981) (noting that “moderate fines do not deter, while severe penalties flow through the 
corporate shell and fall on the relatively blameless.”); John Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen 
when we Need Him?: Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of 
Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 55, 76 (2010) (arguing that “it is impossible to punish a 
corporation.”); Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation:  Rethinking 
a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285, 309-24 (1985) (discussing the 
practical weaknesses of punishing corporations); John B. McAdams, The Appropriate 
Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Liability:  An Eclectic Alternative, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 
989, 990 (1977) (examining proper sanctions for “corporate criminal liability.”).   
 15.  This inability has been called “the blackest hole in the theory of corporate criminal 
law.”  Brent Fisse, Restructuring Corporate Criminal Law:  Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, 
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L REV. 1141, 1183 (1983).  
 16.  Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos:  A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991).  
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we will consider imposition of criminal liability under the corporate ethos 
model.  This section will examine the corporate culture of the CRAs and 
outline how that culture played a role in encouraging the mis-rating of 
mortgage-backed securities and CDOs prior to the GFC.  We will conclude 
that the reforms of Dodd-Frank, as presently implemented, are inadequate 
to prevent similar misconduct in the future and argue for imposition of 
criminal liability.  We believe that imposition of criminal liability will best 
serve the public policy objectives of retribution, deterrence and 
rehabilitation.
17
 
I. ATTACHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO CORPORATIONS 
A. Criminal Law vs. Civil Law 
The public policy objectives served by imposition of civil liability 
differ significantly from those of criminal law.  Civil liability is largely 
compensatory—the judgments imposed serve to compensate injured 
plaintiffs.  Criminal law is largely punitive—the fines and other sanctions 
imposed serve to punish criminal defendants.
18
  While both criminal and 
civil liabilities are intended to deter future misconduct, the similarities end 
there.  Criminal law acts as a vehicle to punish wrongdoers, as a deterrent 
against future wrongdoing, and serves a rehabilitative function.
19
 
In the case of corporate crime, retribution—one of the goals of 
criminal law—is achieved through assessment of a fine on the 
corporation.
20
  To the extent that criminality is based on an assessment of 
 
 17.  By advocating adoption of the corporate ethos model for finding the requisite mens 
rea, we are expressly rejecting both the traditional respondeat superior model and strict 
liability.  See Joshua Fershee, Choosing a Better Path:  The Misguided Appeal of Increased 
Criminal Liability After Deepwater Horizon, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 
(2011) (rejecting application of strict liability to environmental crimes). 
 18.   For a discussion of the difference between damages awarded in civil suits and 
fines imposed in the criminal context, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic 
Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 619 (1998) (“Just as fines fail to express 
condemnation relative to imprisonment of natural persons, so civil damages fail to express it 
relative to criminal liability for corporations.  Indeed, like fines, civil damages seem to 
connote that society is ‘pricing’ corporate crime.”). 
 19.  Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal Liability Versus Corporate Securities 
Fraud Liability:  Analyzing the Divergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 157, 170 (2009) (“The goals of imposing corporate criminal liability are retribution, 
rehabilitation and deterrence.”); Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment:  Rehabilitating 
Retribution as a Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L. J. 109 
(2010) (arguing for a renewed focus on retribution as a goal of criminal law). 
 20.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 170 (“[T]he fine is meant to be proportional to the harm 
committed by the corporate offender in an effort to satisfy the public’s demand for 
justice.”).   
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the individual wrongdoer’s intent, action, and voluntariness, it makes sense 
to punish the individual who violates accepted societal norms.  By contrast, 
imposition of punishment upon a corporation can be problematic.  To what 
extent can one judge the intent, action, and voluntariness of a corporate 
entity?
21
  In other words, is the corporate entity deserving of punishment 
for the actions of an individual employee?  Another problem with 
punishing a corporation by imposing criminal liability upon the corporate 
entity is the fact that there are negative spillover effects.
22
  By punishing the 
corporate wrongdoer, we are simultaneously punishing innocent 
shareholders, employees, and consumers.
23
  Nevertheless, retribution is an 
important public policy goal furthered by imposition of criminal penalties 
upon corporations.
24
 
 
 21.  In other words, to what extent can a corporation be deemed blameworthy if it lacks 
consciousness?  Robson, supra note 19, at 128.  We will argue that imposition of liability 
upon a corporation based on the corporate ethos theory makes more sense from a retributive 
standpoint than imposition based on the traditional notions of respondeat superior.  Under 
respondeat superior, liability can be imposed on a corporation for the action of an individual 
employee even if all possible actions have been taken by a corporation to prevent it.  See 
infra note 42 and accompanying text (describing how a corporation may be held liable for 
antitrust violations of its employees).  By contrast, under the corporate ethos theory, liability 
is only imposed on a corporation to the extent that the corporate culture actually encouraged 
the illegal conduct.   
 22.  See Cheryl L. Evans, The Case for More Rational Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Where Do We Go From Here?, 41 STETSON L. REV. 21, 23 (2011) (“Certainly, charging a 
company for the actions of one or more persons, in some circumstances, will directly harm 
innocent participants, such as shareholders or even important end-users of products.”); Lisa 
M. Fairfax, On the  Sufficiency of Corporate Regulation as an  Alternative to Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 117, 124-25 (Fairfax terms this the “innocent 
shareholder critique.”); Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues:  An Urgent Call for an 
Affirmative Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 56 (2012) 
(“Vicarious corporate liability requires the cost of wrongdoing to be passed onto innocent 
parties who have not committed the illegal acts and do not have the ability to stop them.”); 
see also Pamela H. Bucy, Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1287, 1288 (2007) (“[T]here is no question that criminal prosecution of a corporation 
has a tremendous impact on the corporation and its community, employees, customers and 
lenders”). But see, Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1485 (2009) (arguing that concern about the spillover 
effects are overrated and pointing out that such arguments apply equally to civil liability 
including punitive damages and that these same third parties might benefit from the 
corporate wrongdoing so it seems incongruous to be concerned about them bearing a small 
part in the penalties imposed).   
 23.  Hasnas, supra note 14, at 77 (“The characteristic that all of these stakeholder 
groups share is that their members are innocent of personal wrongdoing.”).  Because of this, 
Hasnas argues imposition of corporate criminal liability is “inherently unjust.”  Hasnas, 
supra note 14, at 76. 
 24.  See generally Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000) (responding to critics of corporate criminal liability 
and defending the concept); Robson, supra note 19 (arguing that inclusion of criminal 
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Another goal of criminal law is to deter misconduct.  To the extent 
that deterrence is a justification for imposition of criminal penalties, it is 
traditionally broken down into specific and general deterrence.  Specific 
deterrence is intended to deter this particular defendant from committing 
criminal acts in the future; general deterrence is intended to deter other 
similarly situated individuals from engaging in similar misconduct.
25
  
Deterring agent misconduct has, in fact, been termed the “enduring policy 
behind criminally punishing corporations.”
26
  Imposing criminal liability 
upon the corporation is designed to deter corporate employees from 
engaging in misconduct and, at the same time, influence those in positions 
of power to properly monitor their subordinates.  Here, the public policy 
goal of deterring misconduct is shaped by the increasingly dominant role 
that corporations play in society.
27
  In other words, because corporate 
conduct has the potential to greatly impact society, it is important that 
corporations be deterred from engaging in misconduct that would 
negatively affect society.  However, the corporation may view most 
potential fines, even criminal fines, as a “cost of doing business,” and as 
such, fines may not provide sufficient incentives to deter misconduct or for 
corporations to develop effective training and compliance programs.
28
 
A final goal of criminal law is rehabilitation.  In the corporate context, 
rehabilitation is based on the belief that imposing criminal sanctions can 
encourage a corporation to change its corporate culture.
29
  Here, “the use of 
the criminal law should be directed primarily toward enabling the 
 
penalties towards corporate actors may have the effect of focusing organizational criminal 
liability towards areas worthy of criminal penalties and sanction).  
 25.  Narine, supra note 22, at 54; Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1325 (2007).   
 26.  George R. Skupski, The Senior Management Mens Rea:  Another Stab at a 
Workable Integration of Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263, 268 (2011).   
 27.  Corporations are capable of causing significantly more harm than individual 
misconduct.  Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Liability:  The DOJ’s 
Internal Moral - Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 
7, 10 (2011) (“[I]t is vital to society that entities as powerful as corporations be accountable 
for their actions in both the civil and criminal arenas.”); Skupski, supra note 26, at 268 
(citing MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 8 (2006) which 
outlines the costs of corporate crime as including “injuries, deaths, and health hazards.”).   
 28.  Narine, supra note 22, at 57-58.   
 29.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2008) (“Indicting 
corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to be a force for positive change of 
corporate culture . . . .”); Kircher, supra note 19, at 170 (“[I]t is believed that imposing 
sanctions on a corporation can correct the organization’s corporate culture and that criminal 
sanctions can result in an all-encompassing and radical reconstruction of the corporation’s 
ethos.”).   
ELLIS & DOW_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:53 PM 
176 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
corporation to reform itself.”
30
  The focus is on what steps the corporation 
can take to assure that similar wrongdoing is unlikely to occur in the future.  
Most corporations already have compliance programs in place.  In the case 
of corporate crime, the existing compliance program has obviously failed to 
prevent the wrongdoing.  Rehabilitation asks the corporation to explore 
why such programs failed.  In the case of a rogue employee who 
circumvented the monitoring mechanisms and ignored training, dismissal 
of that employee might be enough.  On the other hand, where the formal 
compliance program is not inculcated as part of the informal culture, action 
must be taken to reform that culture so that it is in alignment with the 
formal compliance culture.
31
  In the case of continued or systemic 
violations despite the presence of a compliance program, criminal 
prosecution can mandate or encourage the type of change needed in 
corporate culture and, thus, fulfill the rehabilitative goal of criminal law.
32
 
B. Attaching Criminal Liability to Corporations: Respondeat Superior 
Because of the severity of criminal sanctions, criminal liability is not 
imposed lightly.  Among other safeguards, in order to attach criminal 
liability, the defendant must have committed the act intentionally—the so-
called mens rea requirement.
33
  This requirement creates difficulties in 
imposing criminal liability in the case of corporate wrongdoing.
34
  The 
 
 30.  Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1428 (2009). 
 31.  Henning, supra note 30, at 1430 (“The real issue is when there is a breakdown in 
the company’s compliance effort traceable to a corporate culture that pressures employees to 
engage in risky conduct, despite the presence of systems designed to prevent violations.”).  
One way in which such culture change has been mandated at the federal level is through the 
use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs).  
Peter Henning argues that the use of DPAs and NPAs meet the rehabilitation policy 
objective.  Henning, supra note 30, at 1420.   
 32.  It has been asserted that by “focusing more on prospective questions of corporate 
governance and compliance, and less on the retrospective question of the entity’s criminal 
liability, federal prosecutors have fashioned a new role for themselves in policing, and 
supervising, corporate America.”  Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the “New 
Regulators”:  Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
159, 161 (2008). 
 33.  Barry J. Pollack, Time to Stop Living Vicariously:  A Better Approach to Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2009).   
 34.  See also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 405 (1958) (positing that what differentiates a crime from a tort is that a crime 
entails a “pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community”); Henning, supra 
note 30, at 1420 (“My position is that designating conduct as criminal is important apart 
from any sanction imposed and that the application of the criminal law to an actor in society 
is a means to express a moral judgment about the actor’s conduct.”); William S. Laufer & 
Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. 
ELLIS & DOW_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:53 PM 
2014]  ATTACHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO CRAS 177 
 
problem is relatively straightforward.  Corporations as legal fictions cannot 
have intent; only corporate agents can intend their actions.  Courts seeking 
to attach criminal liability have dealt with this in a few ways.  In some 
cases, the individuals involved in the wrongdoing are prosecuted 
individually.
35
  For example, in the aftermath of Enron, prosecutors 
 
CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1292 (2000) (“[O]nly criminal punishment involves expressing moral 
censure and moral condemnation.”); Weissmann, supra note 25, at 1324 (“Criminal law, 
after all, is reserved for conduct that we find so repugnant as to warrant the severest 
sanction.”). See generally Patricia Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate 
Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (2006) (imposing criminal liability in the case of 
corporate wrongdoing is difficult when there is an intentional act requirement).  Some argue 
that what sets criminal liability apart from imposition of civil liability is the “moral scorn 
and condemnation that only criminal punishment entails.”  Kircher, supra note 19, at 170.  
To the extent that criminal law assigns liability based on the moral accountability of the 
wrongdoer, attaching criminal liability to corporations for the actions of its agent is 
problematic.  A corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties 
which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).  Skupski argues that “American courts borrowed from 
English common law the view that a corporation is merely an aggregation of its individual 
members and may act only through those members in their individual capacities” and that 
this view was “entirely inconsistent with the imputation of criminal liability.”  Skupski, 
supra note 26, at 266.  Miriam Baer outlines two views of the corporate form—the 
communitarian view (which views the corporation as a social institution with an 
“identifiable personality”) and the contractarian view (which views the corporation as a 
“nexus of contracts.”).  Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and Tension Between 
Corporate and Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2010).  Patricia Abril and Ann Morales 
Olazábal discuss what they term the “nominalist” and “realist” theories of corporate 
personality.  Under the nominalist theory, corporations are viewed as the mere name for a 
group of individual actors.  By contrast, under the realist theory, corporations are viewed as 
having a unique culture independent from the individual actors.  Abril & Olazábal, supra, at 
103.  In many ways this underlies the debate about whether or not a corporation can be 
morally responsible.  If one views a corporation as merely an organization of individuals, 
the corporation itself has no moral responsibility.  In his seminal piece on corporate 
responsibility Manuel Velasquez took this position.  See Manuel Velasquez, Why 
Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF’L ETHICS 
J. 1, 7 (1983) (arguing that moral responsibility for wrongdoing within the corporation rests 
solely on the individual actor).   
  Others have argued, based primarily on organizational theory, that corporations can 
have a conscience.  See, e.g., Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Can a 
Corporation Have a Conscience?, 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132 (1982) (arguing that corporate 
actors should act as people in regards to moral and ethical decisions and advocating that 
corporations develop consciences towards specific issues); see also Sarah Kelly-Kilgore & 
Emily M. Smith, Corporate Criminal Liability, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 421, 422 (2011) 
(“Corporate criminal liability developed as courts struggled to overcome the problem of 
assigning criminal blame to fictional entities in a legal system based on the moral 
accountability of individuals.”) (internal footnote omitted).  For a discussion of the 
philosophical justifications for assigning moral responsibilities to corporations, see, e.g., 
Peter French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 207 (1970).   
 35.   Some scholars have argued that civil liability should be imposed on the corporate 
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targeted corporate officers rather than the corporation.
36
  
 Alternatively, criminal liability can be imposed upon the corporate 
entity. Courts have utilized a number of theories to overcome the mens rea 
hurdle in the case of corporate misconduct.  Traditionally, liability has been 
attached under the agency doctrine of respondeat superior.
37
 In order to 
attach criminal liability to a corporation under respondeat superior, an 
individual must have committed the criminal act: 1) within the scope of 
his/her employment; and 2) at least, in part, to benefit the corporation.  In 
addition, 3) it must be possible to identify a culpable individual.
38
 
1. Within the Scope of Employment 
The first requirement to attach liability to the corporation for criminal 
acts committed by an employee is that the act must be committed within 
the scope of the agent’s employment.  This requirement is met if the 
employee-agent is acting with either actual or apparent authority.
39
  A 
 
entity with criminal liability imposed on the individual corporate wrongdoers.  See generally 
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:  An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 691-92 n.12 (1997) (noting that 
scholars have discussed the merits of criminal and civil liability in various scenarios and 
how based on the issue at hand, sometimes imposing individual liability is optimal and in 
other cases, imposing liability on the group or corporate actor as a whole produces optimal 
results).  This alternative ignores, however, the role that the corporate actor played in 
encouraging or rewarding the wrongdoing.  At least one scholar has argued that criminal 
liability should be attached to the individual actors within CRAs.  David A. Maas, Policing 
the Rating Agencies:  The Case for Stronger Criminal Disincentives in the Credit  Rating 
Market, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1005 (2011) (arguing for the application of 
targeted criminal law).  Instead of individual criminal liability, we intend to focus on the 
extent to which criminal liability could and should attach to CRAs—the corporate entities—
for inaccurate ratings such as the ratings issued leading up to the GFC.   
 36.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 422 n.7.   
 37.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 157; Weissmann, supra note 25, at 1319 n.1.  Corporate 
criminal liability was first imposed in the case of New York Central and Hudson River R.R. 
Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).  In that case, the court reasoned that it is “only a 
step farther” to hold a corporation criminally liable under circumstances where they would 
be clearly held civilly liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Id. at 494.  It 
continued: 
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the 
corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents 
and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and 
intent of its agents whom it has entrusted authority to act. 
Id. at 495.  Insulating corporations from criminal liability would “virtually take away the 
only means of effectually controlling” corporations and would allow the law to “shut its 
eyes to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern times are 
conducted through” corporations.  Id. at 496, 495.   
     38.    Bucy supra note 22, at 1289. 
     39.  See RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.04 (2006) (“A principal is subject to 
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corporation is criminally liable for the criminal acts of an employee when 
that employee is acting under the express direction of the corporation 
(actual authority)
40
 or if the prosecution can prove that the employee-agent 
was acting with apparent authority.  Under apparent authority, the 
corporation faces criminal liability where a third-party reasonably believed 
that the agent had authority to perform the act at issue.
41
  This is true even 
if the action was expressly forbidden by the corporation and even if the 
corporation has taken efforts to deter such conduct.
42
  In addition, under 
federal law, there are circumstances where criminal liability may be 
imputed to the corporation even for actions taken by lower level employee-
agents.
43
 
 
liability to a third party harmed by an agent’s conduct when the agent’s conduct is within 
the scope of the agent’s actual authority.”); id. § 7.08 (“A principal is subject to vicarious 
liability for a tort committed by an agent . . . when actions taken by the agent with apparent 
authority constitute a tort . . . .”). 
 40.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 424 (“Actual authority attaches when a 
corporation knowingly and intentionally authorizes an agent to act on its behalf . . . .”).   
 41.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 424-25.   
 42.  See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(corporations are liable for the acts of their agents “even though their conduct may be 
contrary to their actual instructions or contrary to the corporation’s stated policies.”); United 
States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A] corporation may be 
held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by its employees if they were 
acting within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the 
corporation, even if . . . such acts were against corporate policy or express instructions.”); 
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability:  When Does it Make Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1437, 1441 (2009) (“Courts deem criminal conduct to be ‘within the scope of 
employment’ even if the conduct was specifically forbidden by corporate policy and the 
corporation made good faith efforts to prevent the crime.”); Narine, supra note 22, at 52 
(“Even though courts found the issue of corporate responsibility for the acts of employees a 
difficult one, subsequent courts held companies liable for their employees’ actions even if 
the employee violated clear policies and directives.”); Weissmann, supra note 25, at 1320 
(“[A] corporation can be held liable for agents no matter what their place in the corporate 
hierarchy and regardless of the efforts in place on the part of corporate managers to deter 
their conduct.”).  The penalty imposed may, however, be reduced if the corporation can 
demonstrate that it has policies in place designed to avoid the criminal behavior.  See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2009) (subtracting points from culpability 
score when compliance program is in place).   
 43.  See In re Hellenic, Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging the fact 
that courts are not in agreement as to whether to impute liability from the actions of lower-
level employees; instead the decision is typically based on the scope of the agent’s 
responsibilities rather than his or her rank); Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 425 
(“[A] corporation may be liable for the actions of its agents regardless of the agent’s 
position within the corporation.”).  Whether or not criminal liability can be imputed to the 
corporation for actions by lower level employees under state law depends on the state.  See 
Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 426 (noting that some states have imputed actions 
onto the corporation even when board of directors did not specifically approve the 
employees behavior). An alternative approach is advocated by the Model Penal Code.  
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2. Acts Must be Designed to Benefit the Corporation 
The second requirement needed to impute criminal liability to a 
corporation is that the agent’s actions must be designed, at least in part, to 
benefit the corporation.
44
  It is not necessary, however, that the corporation 
actually receive any benefit;
45
 nor is it necessary that the individual agent 
act for the corporate benefit only with no regard for his/her individual 
interest.
46
  Further, the mere fact that the agent is acting in violation of a 
corporate rule or policy will not insulate the corporation from liability.
47
  In 
other words, the corporation is liable regardless of the steps that it has 
taken to prevent the wrongdoing, even if no one in the corporation other 
than the wrongdoer is aware of the conduct.
48
 
3. Identification of culpable individual 
In order to attach liability under respondeat superior, corporations are 
held liable only if a specific guilty individual can be identified.
49
 Therefore, 
it is possible for corporations to escape liability where no individual agents 
are found with the requisite intent. This means that it is possible for a 
corporation to escape liability where a group of individuals contribute to 
 
Under this approach, corporations are criminally liable if the criminal conduct was 
“authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of 
directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope 
of his office or employment.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c)(Proposed Official Draft 
1962).  Thus, the Model Penal Code uses a respondeat superior approach but limits liability 
to the conduct of high level employees.   
 44.  Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 129 (1962) (“[T]he corporation 
does not acquire that knowledge or possess the requisite state of mind essential for 
responsibility, through the activities of unfaithful servants whose conduct was undertaken to 
advance the interests of parties other than their corporate employer.”)  (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Weissmann, supra note 25, at 1320, 1330.   
 45.  Caitlin F. Saladrigas, Corporate Criminal Liability:  Lessons from the Rothstein 
Debacle, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 435, 441 (2012).   
 46.  Bucy, supra note 42, at 1441 (“Courts also deem criminal conduct by a corporate 
agent to be with the intent to benefit the corporation, even when the corporation received no 
actual benefit”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Weissmann, supra note 25, at 1320.  
 47.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 427.   
 48.  Bucy, supra note 16, at 1103.   
 49.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 159 (“[P]articularly with respect to specific intent 
crimes, the respondeat superior approach is highly problematic because the corporate 
structure can make it difficult to locate and establish the guilt of agents who possess the 
requisite intent and, thus, the corporate defendant has the advantage of being able to create 
reasonable doubt as to each agent and to escape liability altogether.”). But see Stacey 
Neumann Vu, Corporate Criminal Liability:  Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of 
Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L.  REV. 459 (2004) (arguing that corporations should 
be criminally liable even when the specific guilty individual has not been identified).   
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the crime, but no single individual can be identified with knowledge of 
wrongdoing.  As a partial response to this shortcoming, courts have in 
some cases imputed intent under the willful blindness or the collective 
knowledge doctrines.
50
 
Under the willful blindness doctrine, a corporation can be found liable 
where it is found to have deliberately disregarded the occurrence of 
criminal conduct.  This might happen, for example, where a manager 
becomes aware of criminal activity by an employee but makes no attempt 
to further investigate or to halt the activity.
51
  Under this doctrine, the 
corporate mens rea requirement is satisfied by the actual knowledge or 
conscious avoidance by the manager.
52
  The collective knowledge doctrine 
is similar.  Here the aggregate knowledge of all or some of the employees 
is imputed to the corporation.  In other words, various agents’ actions and 
states of mind are aggregated and imputed to the corporation.
53
  This allows 
the corporation to face liability where no single employee is at fault
54
 or 
where the actions of the individual employees are so compartmentalized 
that no one individual is entirely at fault.
55
  For example, under the doctrine 
of collective knowledge it would be possible to impose liability upon a 
corporation for securities fraud based on misrepresentation of fact, even 
where the corporate officer making the statement had no knowledge that 
the statement he was making was false, if another corporate officer had the 
requisite knowledge.
56
  While some courts have accepted this doctrine,
57
 
 
 50.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 431-32.   
 51.  Vu, supra note 49, at 473 (“A willful blindness instruction in the corporate context 
allows the jury to make a finding of knowledge where the corporation was suspicious of 
criminal conduct yet failed to make inquiries, thereby choosing to remain ignorant.”).  This 
is also referred to as the “ostrich” instruction.  Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing with the 
Rules:  An Effort to Strengthen the Mens Rea Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 685, 696 (2011).   
 52.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 431.  Relevant factors include whether 
the management ratified the conduct or consciously avoided discovering it, whether the 
corporation expressly forbade the practice, and the number of times such conduct occurred.  
Vu, supra note 49, at 473.   
 53.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 160 (“[W]here no culpable employee can be found, some 
courts have decided to aggregate corporate agents’ actions and states of mind and impute 
them to the corporation.”).   
 54.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 431; Jennifer Moore, Corporate 
Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 763 (1992) 
(describing how collective knowledge “enables courts to find liability in cases in which the 
corporation seems ‘justly to blame’ for the crime, but no single individual has the required 
mens rea.”).   
 55.  Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 431-32; Skupski, supra note 26, at 281-
85.   
 56.  In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (to 
“carry their burden of showing that a corporate defendant acted with scienter, plaintiffs in 
securities fraud cases need not prove that any one individual employee of a corporate 
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other courts have only used it to impute liability to corporations when 
coupled with willful blindness.
58
  Some courts have refused to recognize 
this doctrine at all.
59
  
While respondeat superior is the traditional model of imposing 
criminal liability upon the corporation, it has been the target of intense 
criticism by commentators.
60
  Taken together, these arguments posit that it 
 
defendant also acted with scienter.  Proof of a corporation’s collective knowledge and intent 
is sufficient.”); In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 1897 (HB), 2006 WL 
314524, at *9, *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A plaintiff may, and in this case has, alleged scienter 
on the part of a corporate defendant without pleading scienter against any particular 
employees of the corporation.”); see also Kevin M. O’Riordan, Note, Clear Support or 
Cause for Suspicion?  A Critique of Collective Scienter in Securities Litigation, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 1596, 1609-11 (2007) (discussing the Dynex line of cases).   
 57.  See, e.g., Abril & Olazábal, supra note 34, at 116-20 (identifying and describing 
decisions that used collective knowledge doctrine).   
 58.  See Thomas A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate 
Corporate Knowledge:  A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 236-37 (1997) 
(“[N]o company was ever convicted without having acted in some conscious, culpable 
manner. . . . Rather, when courts have aggregated knowledge, they invariably have done so 
as a technique in response to willful blindness to inculpatory knowledge.”). 
 59.  See, e.g., In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 303 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A 
corporation is deemed to have the requisite scienter for fraud only if the individual corporate 
officer making the statement has the requisite level of scienter at the time he or she makes 
the statement.”); Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 
(5th Cir. 2004) (it is “appropriate to look to the state of mind of the individual corporate 
official or officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its making or 
issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion therein . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here 
is no case law supporting an independent collective scienter theory.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also In re Apple Computer, Inc., Sec. Litig.,  243 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 
1023 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5511 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 2005). It is not 
enough to establish fraud on the part of a corporation that one corporate officer makes a 
false statement that another officer knows to be false.  A defendant corporation is deemed to 
have the requisite scienter for fraud only if the individual corporate officer making the 
statement has the requisite level of scienter, i.e., knows that the statement is false, or is at 
least deliberately reckless as to its falsity, at the time that he or she makes the statement. 
Stacey Neumann Vu concluded that “the corporate knowledge and willful blindness 
doctrines, as they stand, have limited use in overcoming the prosecutorial problem of 
locating an agent and establishing guilt when a corporation has committed a specific intent 
crime.”  Vu, supra note 49, at 475; see also Kircher, supra note 19, at 162-63 (discussing 
courts rejecting the collective scienter doctrine); O’Riordan, supra note 56, at 1607-09 
(discussing In re Apple Computer, Inc., Sec. Litig. 243 F. Supp. 2d 1012).   
 60.  Thus, many have argued that vicarious liability is not appropriate in the case of 
criminal liability.  See, e.g., Laufer & Strudler, supra note 34, at 1311 (noting that “[t]he 
risk of unfairly casting moral blame and criminal liability on an entity is greater with 
vicarious liability. . . . Vicarious fault does not asses the entity’s contribution to its agents’ 
wrongdoing.”) (internal footnote omitted); see also Moohr, supra note 51, at 685 (arguing 
“the diminished significance of the mens rea element is part of the trend to 
overcriminalize.”) (emphasis in original). 
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is unfair to impose criminal liability upon a corporation under the 
respondeat superior model due its weaknesses.
61
 
First, the doctrine fails to recognize the inherent differences between 
civil and criminal law. As mentioned above, the primary purpose of civil 
law is compensatory.  Thus, one goal of holding a corporation vicariously 
liable for the torts committed by its agents relates to the corporation’s 
ability to best compensate the injured party.  As such, tort liability can be 
seen as a cost of doing business; its likelihood is reflected in the cost of the 
products or services sold and the corporation typically obtains insurance to 
cover tort judgments.  Any deterrent effect is viewed as a “byproduct of the 
desired compensation.”
62
  The goals of retribution and rehabilitation are 
absent entirely. 
Second, the respondeat superior model fails to provide adequate 
deterrence.  Arguably, under respondeat superior, the corporation is 
incentivized to monitor and police its employees to avoid criminal 
charges.
63
  In this way, both types of deterrence are promoted – the 
individual employee is discouraged from engaging in criminal misconduct, 
and his or her supervisors are encouraged to monitor and influence their 
employees to refrain from criminal misconduct.  The typical way that 
corporations act to deter wrongdoing is by adopting corporate codes of 
conduct and compliance programs. The existence of such codes or 
corporate rules will not, however, insulate the corporation from liability for 
the actions of an agent in violation of those rules.  Moreover, under 
respondeat superior the existence of corporate compliance programs is only 
relevant at sentencing.
64
  In addition, oftentimes corporations have formal 
rules in place, while at the same time incentivizing contrary behavior.  
Therefore, it is argued that attaching liability under respondeat superior 
provides inadequate incentives for corporations to develop, implement, and 
enforce effective corporate compliance programs.
65
  Some commentators 
 
 61.  Evans, supra note 22, at 25 (questioning whether blanket application of respondeat 
superior is fair to corporations); Kircher, supra note 19, at 159 (“Fairness requires that ‘a 
corporation should neither escape liability nor be held criminally responsible simply 
because it is a collective body.’”) (quoting Moohr, infra note 76, at 1364).   
 62.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 271.   
 63.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 268 (describing the “enduring policy behind criminally 
punishing corporations” as one of “deterring agent misconduct by allocating risk of criminal 
liability to the corporation to incentivize greater control of its agents.”).   
 64.  Evans, supra note 22, at 26; Narine, supra note 22, at 45.   
 65.  Bucy, supra note 42, at 1441 (“[T]his standard provides no incentives for 
companies to expend resources to institute effective compliance programs.”).  Some 
scholars have concluded that the objective of deterrence would be better met by imposition 
of civil liability and that the higher costs of borne by society where criminal liability is 
imposed are not justified by the minimal deterrent effect.  See Henning, supra note 30, at 
1425-26 (summarizing arguments that deterrence is better achieved through civil rather than 
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have argued that respondeat superior actually creates “contrary control 
incentives.”
66
  In other words, it is argued that the type of strict liability 
imposed by respondeat superior
67
 creates an incentive for corporations to 
“forgo preventative measures or to obscure misconduct.”
68
   
Third, some argue that the model of respondeat superior fails to serve 
any real retributive function.  The goal of retribution as a part of criminal 
law stems from the belief that is proper to punish wrongdoers when their 
conduct is morally repugnant.  The problem in the case of respondeat 
superior is obvious; liability is imposed upon the corporation without 
finding the corporation morally culpable.
69
  Because the doctrine of 
respondeat superior ignores issues of corporate culture, it fails to 
“‘distinguish between [the corporation or the individual that is] culpable 
and those that are not.’”
70
 
 
criminal liability).   
 66.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 273.   
 67.  Arguably, this is strict liability because liability is unrelated to the conduct of the 
corporation.  Even if the corporation has strict rules in place and a strict compliance 
program, it will face liability for the conduct of “rogue” agents.  See Skupski, supra note 26, 
at 273 (discussing this example and labeling it strict liability).   
 68.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 274.  See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate 
Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 276 (2008) (“When they cannot eliminate 
misconduct, firms might respond to the threat of harsh sanctions by reducing their 
monitoring effort.”); see also Pollack, supra note 33, at 1393 (arguing that corporations 
have sufficient incentives to create and enforce strong compliance programs and that 
exempting corporations who have such programs from liability does nothing to change the 
incentives, as “[c]ontinuing to expose corporations that lack adequate compliance programs 
to vicarious liability while shielding those that do have such programs adds no meaningful 
additional incentive to corporations to create and maintain such programs.”).  Narine argues 
that the present system provides little incentives for corporate management to monitor 
employee behavior.  Narine, supra note 22, at 45 (“Ironically, this means that companies 
receive the maximum benefit from compliance programs that appear to comply with the 
Guidelines but that do not actually detect or deter wrongful conduct.”) (emphasis in 
original).  
 69.  See Bucy, supra note 16, at 1104 (“Under this approach all corporations, honest or 
dishonest, good or bad, are convicted if the government can prove that even one maverick 
employee committed criminal conduct.”); Dervan, supra note 27, at 10 (“[T]he current 
standard allows conviction of corporations when the entity has engaged in no morally 
culpable behavior.”); Evans, supra note 22, at 28 (“[C]riminal conviction connotes moral 
blameworthiness and should be reserved for those instances in which the government can 
point to a substantive wrong in the corporation’s compliance practices, leadership, culture, 
or internal controls.”); see also Laufer & Strudler, supra note 34, at 1297 (“Perceptions of 
fairness and justice hinge on the degree of attenuation between the acts and intentions of 
corporate and human persons.”).  Some scholars compare imposing liability on a 
corporation that has a compliance program in place to deter corporate misconduct to 
imposing liability on someone who lacks mental capacity.  See, e.g., Weissmann, supra note 
25, at 1328 (“A corporation that has taken all practical efforts to prevent the conduct that 
forms the basis of a current criminal charge is similarly lacking in volition.”).   
 70.  Bucy, supra note 42, at 1442.  See, e.g., Dervan, supra note 27, at 10 (asking us to 
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Fourth, utilizing the respondeat superior model promotes inconsistent 
enforcement by being both under and over-inclusive.  Some commentators 
have argued that the theory is over-inclusive, giving prosecutors too much 
discretion and forcing even innocent corporations to accept responsibility 
to avoid prosecution.
71
  This argument recognizes the moral stigma that 
 
consider “the moral distinction between a corporation whose board of directors encourages 
employees to engage in illegal behavior and a corporation that, through utilizing an effective 
compliance program, discovers and punishes a rogue employee who acted against direct 
corporate and managerial instructions to the contrary.”).  Arguably, the lack of any real 
retributive function could be overlooked if the deterrent effect was strong.  See Skupski, 
supra note 26, at 278 (arguing that consideration of the deterrent purpose is greater than the 
consideration of retribution). But, as we have just discussed, the deterrent effect is 
ambivalent at best.   
 71.  See, e.g., Abril & Olazábal, supra note 34, at 113 (emphasizing that respondeat 
superior sometimes leads to unwarranted broad liability); Weissmann, supra note 25, at 
1322 (arguing that under current policy “no systemic checks effectively restrict the 
government’s power to go after corporations.”) (emphasis in original); see also Henning, 
supra note 30, at 1418-19 (providing an overview of the argument that prosecutorial 
discretion leads to over-inclusiveness).  This argument is based on the fear that corporations, 
even innocent corporations, will settle or enter into settlements rather than risk the 
possibility of criminal conviction and the serious consequences.  
  Because the actions of a single low-level employee can trigger corporate criminal 
liability under this doctrine, it is possible for a corporation to face liability even where it 
actually enforces policies designed to prevent such actions.  In other words, as we will 
discuss doctrines that attempt to attach criminal liability based upon ideas of corporate 
culture will look at the extent to which the informal culture of a corporation encourages and 
rewards the criminal behavior.  It is, however, possible that under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for a corporation to be criminally liable even when the culture neither encourages 
nor rewards criminal behavior.  We will argue that theories based on corporate culture better 
strike the balance and are neither over nor under inclusive.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 148-149. 
  From this argument, one might conclude that a myriad of criminal lawsuits were 
brought against corporations in the wake of the GFC.  The opposite is in fact true.  
According to the Wall Street Journal, very few criminal cases have been brought against 
corporate executives involved in actions as part of the GFC.  See Jean Eaglesham, Missing:  
Stats on Crisis Convictions, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303505504577401911741048088.html 
(observing that only one case pursued by the Justice Department deals with a Wall Street 
firm’s wrongdoing that directly impacted the financial crisis)); see also Peter Lattman, A 
Star Panel Debates Financial Crisis Prosecutions, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012, 4:01 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/a-star-panel-debates-financial-crisis-prosecutions/ 
(summarizing the disagreement among a panel of legal experts about whether or not 
executives and Wall Street firms faced sufficient consequences after the financial crisis); 
Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures, 
N. Y. TIMES, April 14, 2011, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business 
/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all (emphasizing that there were no prosecutions of top-
level executives after the financial crisis); No Crime, No Punishment, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
2012, (editorial), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-
crime-no-punishment.html (commenting on the lack of accountability for top firms and top 
executives in light of the financial crisis).  Moreover, in total federal prosecutors bring 
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attaches with criminal liability and the severe impact that can result from 
criminal liability.
72
  Moreover, the doctrine is over-inclusive because under 
respondeat superior, a corporation faces liability for the actions of a rogue 
employee even when it has taken all possible steps to prevent misconduct.
73
  
At the same time, the doctrine is under-inclusive because oftentimes 
prosecutors shy away from criminal prosecution to avoid punishing 
innocent shareholders.
74
  By giving little guidance to prosecutors to 
determine which corporations to prosecute, we are left with arbitrary and 
inconsistent enforcement.
75
  In addition, the doctrine is under-inclusive 
 
criminal charges against less than a few hundred corporations in any given year.  Beale, 
supra note 22, at 1487; Henning, supra note 30, at 1420.   
 72.  See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 68, at 278 (“A conviction could have fatal 
consequences for business entities even when the criminal trial ends with a modest penalty 
for the defendant firm.  Indeed, a variety of laws and regulations can effectively put out of 
business firms convicted of a crime.”).  For example, Arthur Andersen was found guilty and 
a relatively modest fine was imposed.  The firm was forced out of business by this 
conviction, however, because SEC rules forbid a firm from serving as an auditor of a 
publicly traded firm if it has been convicted of a crime.  Hamdani & Klement, supra note 
68, at 278-79; see also Skupski, supra note 26, at 271-72 (contrasting the moral stigma of a 
criminal conviction with the less devastating effects of tort liability).   
 73.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 159 (acknowledging that the respondeat superior 
doctrine fails to distinguish between crimes that are committed with encouragement of 
upper management and those perpetrated by a rogue employee).  One commentator has 
remarked that under the doctrine of respondeat superior the test for imposing criminal 
liability is too easily met.  Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry 
Foul:  Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
53, 76 (2007) (“[T]he criminal case against a corporation, once there is evidence that even a 
single low-level employee engaged in criminal activity on the job, is virtually bulletproof.”).  
Pamela H. Bucy proposes addressing this weakness by creating an affirmative defense based 
on the corporate ethos model discussed below.  She argues that corporations should be 
insulated from liability if they can show that “at the time of the offense it had in place an 
effective corporate compliance program relevant to the crimes alleged.”  Bucy, supra note 
42, at 1442; see also Narine, supra note 22, (advancing a similar argument).  Arguments in 
favor of insulating corporations from liability if they have a policy in place to deter the 
action ignore the difference between formal and informal culture.  The question shouldn’t be 
as simple as whether or not the corporation had a policy in place that forbade the conduct.  
Rather, attention should focus on the extent to which that policy was enforced.  Were 
employees provided mixed messages?  For what type of actions were they rewarded?  Were 
people punished for violating the express policies?  These questions are part of the corporate 
ethos theory discussed below.  Andrew Weissmann recognizes but dismisses these concerns 
as “unrealistic” when he talks about the unlikelihood of corporations adopting “mere show” 
programs to fool the courts.  Weissmann, supra note 25, at 1336 (discussing the harms of 
ineffective compliance programs).  
 74.  See Kelly-Kilgore & Smith, supra note 34, at 422 (“Although criminal prosecution 
of corporations is guided by recognized principles, many prosecutors still proceed against 
corporations with great caution, persuaded by the argument that punishing a corporation in 
effect punishes innocent stockholders.”).   
 75.  See Skupski, supra note 26, at 280 (“Giving the prosecution the nearly unfettered 
discretion to exercise their personal, variable views over whether to indict a corporation, 
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because a corporation can avoid liability if a single agent cannot be 
identified with the requisite mens rea.
76
  
Finally, and most importantly, using the doctrine of respondeat 
superior focuses on the individual actor
77
 and, as such, often fails to 
recognize the role that corporate culture, created by executives, can play in 
fostering illegal conduct by its employees.
78
  In doing so, it fails to focus on 
the actual misconduct by the corporation.
79
  In the next section, we will 
consider alternative theories that shift focus on this misconduct. 
C. Attaching Criminal Liability to Corporations: Corporate Ethos 
Model 
As a response to the inadequacies of the respondeat superior model, 
legal scholars have adopted alternative theories of criminal liability that 
focus on corporate culture.  Doctrines such as the corporate ethos model
80
 
consider the role that corporate culture plays in fostering criminal conduct
81
 
 
without any required adherence to legal standards analyzing genuine corporate culpability, 
opens the door to arbitrariness.”).   
 76.  Because respondeat superior applies only when a single guilty individual can be 
found, it ignores that role that corporate policy can play in encouraging multiple individuals 
to act.  See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees:  Considering Fault-
Based Liability for the Complicit Corporation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 1364 (2007) 
(arguing that corporations should be held responsible for its “complicity in a crime” or 
“unlawful conduct is likely to continue, albeit with a different set of individual actors.”); 
Vu, supra note 49, at 459 (“[C]riminal conviction should be more, not less, likely where 
evidence of multiple guilty agents exists.”).  Skupski describes the respondeat superior 
model as “fatally over - and underinclusive.”  Skupski, supra note 26, at 263.  Further, 
George R. Skupski, argues that the standard fails “without justification, to differentiate 
between the nonblameworthy organizations and those which are genuinely culpable.” 
Skupski, supra note 26, at 264.  
 77. George R. Skupski terms respondeat superior an “individualistic liability scheme” 
and argues that it needs to be overhauled.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 264.   
 78.  See James A. Fanto, Recognizing the ‘Bad Barrel’ in Public Business Firms:  
Social and Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-makers, 57 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“[D]irectors and executives make their decisions or perform their actions 
using existing practices and perspectives – in short, an organizational culture – that have 
been developed over time in the firm.”).   
 79.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 277 (“[T]he strict liability effect respondeat superior 
standard causes a failure to inquire into the genuine culpability of the organization.”).  In 
other words, the focus is on the behavior of the “bad apples,” and the influence of the “bad 
tree” is ignored.  See generally Moohr, supra note 76 (addressing the question of when and 
how to hold corporations responsible for the crimes of their individuals).   
 80.  Abril & Olazábal, supra note 34, at 121-22 (referring to this model as one of 
“corporate character” and describe it as based on the belief that “‘bad’ corporations can 
influence individual and group criminal behavior”). 
 81.  See, e.g., Kircher, supra note 19, at 172 (“[F]orces at work within a corporation can 
sometimes foster, promote or cause criminal behavior on the part of its employees.”); 
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and posit that “organizations possess an identity that is independent of 
specific individuals who control or work for the organization.”
82
  
Application of this model focuses on the “distinct human-like qualities and 
personalities” of corporations “that may induce their employees to act 
wrongfully”
83
 and attaches criminal liability because of that ethos.
84
  This 
theory recognizes that a corporation is a “complex organization” and not a 
person
85
 and is reinforced by social psychology and organizational behavior 
literature that demonstrates the importance of corporate culture in 
contributing to misconduct within a business organization.  Under this 
theory, rather than focusing solely on the behavior of the individual 
wrongdoer, attention is paid to factors that comprise corporate culture, both 
formal and informal.
86
  Corporate criminal liability is appropriate if the 
 
Lederman, supra note 14, at 293-97 (discussing the relationship between perpetrator and 
corporation). See generally Bucy, supra note 16 (exploring the notion of corporate, rather 
than individual, intent).  George R. Skupski suggests a standard based upon an 
approximation of the senior management mens rea, what he terms the SMMR.  Skupski, 
supra note 26, at 265.  He argues that the SMMR standard relies upon both the subjective 
mental states of senior management and reasonable inferences of their culpability based on 
certain variables of organizational culpability.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 265.  Similarly, 
Barry J. Pollack argues that the “collective intent of a corporate entity should be measured 
by the actions, knowledge, and intent of senior management.”  Pollack, supra note 33, at 
1394.  Commentators advance other alternatives.  Geraldine Szott Moohr looks at the role 
that corporate culture plays in encouraging individual misconduct and argues that 
corporations should be charged under the doctrine of accomplice theory.  Moohr supra note 
76, at 1358.  Carlos Gomez-Jara Díez argues that under systems theory, corporations should 
only be held criminally responsible if they are capable of self-organization and self-
governance.  Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, Corporate Culpability as a Limit to the 
Overcriminalization of Corporate Criminal Liability:  The Interplay between Self-
Regulation, Corporate Compliance, and Corporate Citizenship, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 78, 
85 (2011).   
 82.  Bucy, supra note 16, at 1099.   
 83.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 166 (quoting Abril & Olazábal, supra note 34, at 132).   
 84.  Moohr, supra note 76, at 1347 (“Moral content can be found in the ethos of an 
organization.”).  In other words, the requisite intentionality is attributed to the corporation 
because of the corporate culture.  See, e.g., Laufer & Strudler, supra note 34 (discussing the 
importance of corporate intentionality as indicative of moral fault).   
 85.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 287 (“In order to develop an effective system for 
identifying genuine corporate conduct and culpability, it is necessary to ‘drop the analogy of 
the corporation as a person and analyze the behavior of the corporation in terms of what it 
really is:  a complex organization’”) (citing Clinard & Yeager, supra note 27, at 43).   
 86.  See infra notes 106-114 and accompanying text (discussing informal and formal 
culture).  To some extent, this entails an examination of what Peter French termed corporate 
internal decision structures (CID).  French, supra note 34, at 211.  Peter French argued that 
when a corporate act is undertaken pursuant to CID structures that “it is proper to describe it 
as having been done for corporate reasons, as having been caused by a corporate desire 
coupled with a corporate belief and so, in other words, as corporate intentional.”  French, 
supra note 34, at 213.  Similarly, Thomas Donaldson argued that corporations were morally 
responsible if they embody a “process of moral decision-making.”  THOMAS DONALDSON, 
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government can prove that the corporate culture encouraged corporate 
employees to engage in wrongdoing. 
This model has received some judicial support.  Most notably, the 
First Circuit in United States v. Bank of New England, N.A.
87
 aggregated 
and imputed the knowledge of individual bank employees to the corporate 
defendant and held that the bank could be found guilty if the requisite mens 
rea was “present in the sum of its parts.”
88
  The court acknowledged that 
“[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of 
specific duties and operations into smaller components.  The aggregate of 
those components constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular 
operation.”
89
  The court considered factors that it deemed relevant to 
impute “willfulness” to the corporation, such as the extent to which the 
bank as an organization consciously avoided learning about and enforcing 
the statutory reporting requirements and the degree to which it displayed 
“flagrant organizational indifference to the reporting requirements.”
90
 
Under the corporate ethos model, liability is imposed on a corporation 
when the corporate culture creates “an environment or a demonstrable 
personality that encouraged the violation.”
91
  Understanding this theory 
requires a brief examination of the literature considering how individuals 
make decisions within organizations, and the effect of organizational 
cultures upon individual behavior.  We are not offering a comprehensive 
review of such a large area of scholarship; instead, we intend to briefly 
 
CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 30 (1982).  Carlos Gomez-Jara Díez posits that rather than 
focusing on individual conduct, the focus should be on organizational knowledge.  Diez, 
supra note 81, at 85 (“We ought to ask ourselves whether the corporate entity has achieved 
a level of internal complexity that allows it to organize itself in a meaningful way.”).   
 87.  821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).   
 88.  Abril & Olazábal, supra note 34, at 119 (discussing Bank of New England, 821 
F.2d 844).   
 89.  Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 856.   
 90.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 161 (citing Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 855-56).  
Under the doctrine of willful blindness, the requisite knowledge can be found from the 
action of actively avoiding acquiring the positive knowledge.  See, e.g., Abril & Olazábal, 
supra note 34, at 120-21 (discussing the concept of willful blindness in corporate criminal 
behavior); Skupski, supra note 26, at 291 (citing Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 as 
applying the collective knowledge doctrine and concluding that is “simply an inadequate 
patch over a gaping hole in the respondeat superior standard.”).  
 91.  Abril & Olazábal, supra note 34, at 123.  Pamela Bucy calls this the “characteristic 
spirit” of the organization.  Bucy, supra note 16, at 1123 (describing this characteristic spirit 
as “[s]uperficial things such as the manner of dress and the camaraderie of the employees as 
well as formal, written goals and policies . . . .”); see also WALLY OLINS, THE CORPORATE 
PERSONALITY:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF CORPORATE IDENTITY 82 (1978) (“It is not 
true that all big companies are the same – they aren’t. . . . [O]rganisations manage to 
develop an ethos . . . . a personality which is so ingrained, so much a part of them, that the 
corporate identity expresses itself in their every action.”).   
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convey the importance of corporate culture.  In general, we will first 
outline how characteristics of individuals can affect their likelihood to 
engage in misconduct within an organizational framework.  This is 
explored mainly in the psychology literature.  Second, we will outline how 
characteristics of organizations can foster a culture that encourages 
wrongdoing by individuals within that organization.  This is explored 
mainly in the organizational behavior literature.  We will conclude that 
imposition of criminal liability upon a corporation must recognize the role 
that corporate culture plays, and will demonstrate how the corporate ethos 
model focuses on corporate culture. 
1. How characteristics of individuals affect individual behavior 
Characteristics of individuals obviously affect their predisposition to 
commit wrongdoing.
92
  This section will, however, go beyond a simple 
conclusion that bad people—bad apples—are more likely than good people 
to commit bad acts.  Our intent is to explore what factors can influence a 
good person to commit bad acts.  Psychology literature outlines a plethora 
of individual differences and cognitive biases that can influence individual 
decision-making.
93
  For example, this literature outlines the importance of 
conformity in shaping individual behavior.  People both consciously and 
unconsciously conform to the behavior they see around them.
94
  In an 
organization, the power of “groupthink” also strongly influences individual 
behavior.
95
  This means that if other individuals are engaging in 
wrongdoing, such behavior can become accepted.  It can become the way 
things are done.  The literature describes how people engage in “script 
processing,” where they make knee-jerk decisions rather than engaging in 
thoughtful deliberation when faced with complex, but standard, 
 
 92.  Don Mayer, Catharyn Baird & Anita Cava, Restoring the Social Contract of 
Capitalism Through Criminal Liability for Financial Fraud 17 (unpublished paper) (on file 
with the University of Miami) (citing MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND 
SPOTS:  WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 21, 30 (2011)) 
(positing that “despite best efforts to the contrary, unethical decisions are made not 
necessarily due to lack of integrity or lack of a formal ethics code, but to the intricacies of 
human psychology.”).  
 93.  See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Enron:  A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 
417, 423-26 (2003) (looking at cognitive biases as a partial explanation for the Enron 
scandal).   
 94.  Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity:  A Minority of One 
Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS:  GEN. & APPLIED 1, 68-70 
(1956). 
 95.  See Fanto, supra note 78, at 13 (stating that “group members adhere so strongly 
and confidently to the group’s perspective – they become almost pathologically  
cohesive . . . .”).   
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dilemmas.
96
  The literature outlines the fact that people are typically 
obedient and will do what they are told, especially in a group setting.
97
  For 
example, if one is told to rate an issue as AAA, or to modify the model to 
assure that a particular issue is rated highly, we can expect that such orders 
would be followed.  It is known that people respond to rewards and 
incentives, and watch how others are rewarded and punished.
98
  Rewards 
given for achievement of goals, that ignore the way of bringing about that 
achievement, induce people to try to achieve goals without paying attention 
to the ethics or the legality of the methods used.
99
  Psychology literature 
teaches us that most people make ethical decisions by “looking up and 
looking around,”
100
 i.e., people watch others’ behavior for cues about what 
is appropriate.
101
  The “confirmation trap” operates in a way that 
 
 96.  LINDA K. TREVIÑO & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS:  
STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 101-03 (5th ed. 2011); see also BAZERMAN & 
TENBRUNSEL, supra note 92, at 34-36 (describing a system of thinking in which individuals 
intuitively process information in a quick and efficient manner, thereby reaching decisions 
without engaging in much deliberation).   
 97.  See generally Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 371-78 (1963) (describing a study that tested obedience and found 
that individuals tend to obey others who are viewed as legitimate authorities, especially in a 
public setting when there is less time for reflection). 
 98.  Basic reinforcement theory teaches us that people will act in ways that are 
rewarded, and also act to avoid punishment.  TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 96, at 264-69.  
It follows that if people are rewarded for, so called, “making the numbers” at all costs, 
people will act accordingly to meet that goal.  TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 96, at 266 
(noting that “[i]f [employees] observe that people advance by stepping on others, lying to 
customers, and falsifying reports, they’ll be more inclined to do so because they will have 
learned that such behavior is rewarded.”).  Similarly, people will act to avoid punishment.  
In the corporate setting, perhaps the most threatening punishment is the potential of being 
fired.  John C. Coffee, Jr. noted the power of the threat of dismissal.  John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime 
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 229-30 (1991) (stating that “[e]xposed to 
the remote threat of criminal prosecution and the clear and present threat of dismissal, lower 
echelon employees know to which message it is more in their interest to respond.”).  We 
saw an example of this idea with Enron.  As part of Enron’s reward and incentive structure, 
those employees ranked in the bottom percentile each year were dismissed, creating 
incentives to commit wrongdoing.  Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the 
Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate:  
The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 45-55 (2003-2004).  The idea of 
social learning theory extends this influence in a powerful way.  Under this theory, we learn 
that people are influenced not only by their own rewards and punishments, but through 
observing the rewards and punishments that others receive.  ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION:  A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 284-89 (1986). 
 99.  See Dallas, supra note 34, at 34-35 (discussing the impact of tying compensation to 
profit goals).   
 100.   Linda K. Treviño & Michael E. Brown, Managing to be ethical:  Debunking five 
business ethics myths, 18 ACAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE, 69, 72 (2004). 
 101.  See id. (arguing that people “do what others around them do or expect them to 
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encourages individuals to look for evidence to confirm pre-existing 
conclusions, and to disregard information that does not support those 
conclusions.
102
  Coupled with the illusion of optimism,
103
 this means that 
employees of CRAs who were convinced that their unrealistic assumptions 
were true, failed to look for evidence that might have provided red flags.  
They were, for example, convinced that housing prices were going to 
continue to rise because they were rising, and any evidence that the bubble 
was likely to burst was ignored.  Moreover, escalation of commitment 
makes it likely that once started down a path, even a dangerous one, people 
are unlikely to change course.
104
  People act to diffuse responsibility, and 
the greater the number of people who participate in an action, the less 
likely people are to feel a sense of individual responsibility (so-called 
“bystander apathy”).
105
 
2. How characteristics of organizations affect individual behavior: 
the importance of corporate culture 
Corporate culture is shaped by an organization’s goals and values.
106
  
 
do.”) (internal footnote omitted).  This concept is closely related to social processing theory.  
Social processing theory posits, “individuals look for signs of what are acceptable attitudes 
and conduct in groups.”  Fanto, supra note 78, at 11.  Under this theory, if misconduct 
occurs in the group and is accepted by the group, it is likely to reoccur.  Fanto, supra note 
78, at 12.  Merideth Ferguson refers to this as “social comparison” and hypothesizes that 
both direct and indirect observation of others’ behavior influences behavior of others.  
Merideth Ferguson, From Bad to Worse:  A Social Contagion Model of Organizational 
Misbehavior 9-10 (July 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).  In 
other words, hearing stories of co-workers who acted improperly and were rewarded rather 
than punished is just as important as actually witnessing the behavior and consequences.  
Lastly, the pervasiveness of the behavior is also seen as an important factor.  Id.   
 102.  MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 39-41 (3d ed. 
1994).  
 103.  David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of 
Decision Making, 37 Sloan Mgmt. Rev. 9, 18 (1996); see also Frank P. McKenna, It won’t 
happen to me:  Unrealistic optimism or illusion of control?, 84 Brit. J. Psychol. 39 (1993) 
(discussing psychology scholarship, which teaches us that people are overly optimistic about 
favorable outcomes); James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action:  A Study of 
Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1333, 1344 (2001) 
(explaining “over-optimism” to mean that “people overestimate the probability of an 
outcome favorable to them . . . .”). 
 104.  Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Understanding Behavior in Escalation Situations, 
246 SCIENCE 216, 218-19 (1989).  
 105.  John M. Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies:  Diffusion 
of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968).   
 106.  Fanto, supra note 78, at 19 (“Organizational culture is constituted of the values and 
goals, and the ways of thinking and behaving, that typify the organization.”) (internal 
footnote omitted).  
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Culture must, however, be further broken down into formal and informal 
culture.  The formal culture is defined by: leadership, core values, 
organizational hierarchy, training programs, and rewards and incentives.
107
  
Informal culture, on the other hand, is defined by: leadership, stories, 
language, and myths. 
108
  To some extent, formal culture can be viewed as 
how an organization defines itself, and the informal culture can be viewed 
as how an organization actually conducts itself (the “talk” versus the 
“walk”).  Not surprisingly, informal culture plays a more important 
influence on individual behavior than formal culture.
109
 Because individuals 
tend to engage in goal-oriented behavior,
110
 an important aspect of 
corporate culture that influences individual behavior is the goals that are 
set, and the messages that are sent about how to achieve those goals.
111
  In 
other words, individuals will act to achieve organizational goals, often 
without recognizing the ethical or legal ramifications of their actions.
112
 
Leaders play a crucial role in shaping both formal and informal 
culture, and, as such, have the power to corrupt
113
 or to foster the 
development of virtue in others.  Robert Kennedy outlines five practical 
steps in which a leader can create a culture that fosters ethical behavior.
114
  
 
 107.   TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 96, at 155-79 (describing various aspects of 
formal culture). 
 108.  TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 96, at 180-87 (outlining what creates informal 
culture).   
 109.  See Mayer, Baird & Cava, supra note 92, at 26-28 (discussing the misalignment at 
Goldman Sachs between their formal culture, which promised that their “clients’ interests 
always come first” and the informal culture in which they deceived these clients for profit) 
(internal footnote omitted); see also Fanto, supra note 78, at 23 (“This reinforcement does 
not happen just because an organization has formal codes of ethics and policies stating that 
its members should be ethical and follow the law, but from, again, an organizational culture 
exemplified by its leaders and internalized by organization members that allows for this 
expression.”).  See generally Joseph L. Badaracco & Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics:  A 
View from the Trenches, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8 (1995) (discussing how corporate culture is 
set by the actions of high-level managers, not policies or declarations). 
 110.   See, e.g., TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 96, at 261 (discussing the value of goal 
setting for individuals). 
 111.   TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 96, at 261.  
 112.  This is closely tied to the importance of rewards and incentives.  MICHAEL W. 
HUDSON, THE MONSTER:  HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY LENDERS AND WALL STREET 
BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA – AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS 1-2 (2010).  For example, 
Michael Hudson outlines how goals and incentives worked to encourage fraudulent 
behavior at Ameriquest:  “Up and down the line, from loan officers to regional managers 
and vice presidents, Ameriquest’s employees scrambled at the end of each month to push 
through as many loans as possible, to pad their monthly production numbers, boost their 
commissions, and meet Roland Arnall’s expectations.”  Id. 
 113.  Fanto, supra note 78, at 11 (“[T]he group may become corrupt because its leader is 
corrupt.”); see also Robson, supra note 19, at 130 (discussing the fact that the deliberate 
efforts of leadership shape corporate culture). 
 114.  Robert G. Kennedy, Virtue and Corporate Culture:  The Ethical Formation of 
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First, the leader must “attend to the culture of the workplace.”
115
  Here, 
Kennedy focuses on the leader’s power to create a culture in which 
viciousness is not rewarded.  Second, Kennedy tells us that leaders must act 
as both models and coaches of ethical behavior.
116
  Conversely, if they act 
unethically or condone (even implicitly) unethical behavior, they are acting 
as role models for a corrupt culture.  Third, leaders must recognize ethical 
behavior when it occurs.
117
  Fourth, leaders must reward ethical behavior 
and punish unethical behavior.
118
  Fifth, Kennedy recognizes the 
importance of education and training.
119
 
3. Corporate Ethos Theory 
It is clear that individuals acting within an organization can be 
constrained from, or encouraged by, that organization to engage in 
wrongdoing.  An organization with a strong ethical culture, where both 
formal and informal cultures are aligned to address employee behavior, will 
be one in which it is less likely that an individual engage in wrongdoing.  
By contrast, an organization in which the informal culture encourages and 
rewards misconduct will be one in which it is more likely that employees 
engage in such misconduct.  Theories that impose corporate criminal 
liability by focusing only on the individual wrongdoer’s conduct (the “bad 
apple”) ignore the effect that the organizational culture (the “bad barrel”) 
can have.
120
  Moreover, theories that focus on the actions of one individual 
fail to recognize that organizational wrongdoing cannot be easily traced to 
one individual’s single action.  Instead, it is often made up of many small 
actions by many disconnected individuals that, when aggregated, become 
unethical or illegal conduct.
121
  Similarly, theories that call attention to the 
formal culture of an organization by, for example, mitigating liability if the 
 
Baby Wolverines, 17 REV. BUS. 10, 14-15 (1995).   
    115.  Id. at 14.  
    116.   Id. 
    117.   Id. 
    118.   Id. at 15 
    119.   Id. 
 120.  Fanto, supra note 78, at 7.  For example, in 2008, Siemens agreed to pay more than 
$540 million in corporate criminal fines, stemming from violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.  Beale, supra note 22, at 1484.  In this case, U.S. investigators concluded that 
“the use of bribes and kickbacks were not anomalies, but the corporation’s standard 
operating procedure and part of its business strategy.”  Beale, supra note 22, at 1484 
(internal footnote omitted). 
 121.  Fanto, supra note 78, at 26 (“[O]rganizational misconduct may also not be easily 
traceable to one bad act; rather, it is made up of small decisions or actions that may be at 
first ethically or legally equivocal and that are the bases for later decisions or actions that 
eventually and cumulatively are clearly unethical and illegal.”). 
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corporation has formal policies in place to deter such conduct, fail to 
recognize the primacy of the informal culture.  The corporate ethos theory 
addresses those shortfalls. 
As stated above, the corporate ethos model imposes criminal liability 
when the corporate culture has encouraged criminal behavior. Bucy 
identifies six factors that are relevant when analyzing the corporate ethos of 
a given corporation.
122
  The first aspect of corporate culture that is relevant 
to identifying the corporate ethos is its hierarchy.
123
 This aspect recognizes 
the role that leaders play in shaping both formal and informal culture, and 
focuses on how the actions of leaders might encourage misconduct.  In a 
strong organizational culture, the leader should pay attention to the culture 
of the corporation. This means, among other things, that the leader should 
discuss unethical behavior by employees, punish such behavior, and outline 
a plan to minimize the likelihood that such behavior will occur again.
124
 
Second, the corporate ethos is shaped by corporate goals.
125
  Recall 
what we know about obedience and the effect of goal-driven behavior.
126
  
When tasked with meeting certain goals, and informed that the method of 
achieving them is unimportant, people are likely to reach goals by any 
means possible.  As illustrated by considering British Petroleum (BP) prior 
to the Deepwater Horizon spill, one can get a sense of what a business is 
really about by examining its goals.  Although BP’s CEO Tony Hayward 
publicly declared his company’s safety-first stance, he made cost-cutting a 
primary corporate goal and slashed budgets.
127
  Practically speaking, BP’s 
increased safety measures were incompatible with its cost-cutting goals.
128
  
Despite this example, it is possible for a corporation to set meaningful 
 
   122.    See generally Bucy, supra note 16, at 1128-46 (identifying six factors). 
 123.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 289; Bucy, supra note 16, at 1128-29; see also Kircher, 
supra note 19, at 172 (explaining that a corporation’s policies, compensation structure, and 
treatment of past offenses are factors used to determine the organization’s corporate ethos).  
 124.  Bucy, supra note 42, at 1449-51.   
 125.  Bucy, supra note 16, at 1133 (recommending examining corporate goals to 
determine “whether the goals set by the corporation . . . promote lawful behavior or are so 
unrealistic that they encourage illegal behavior.”).   
 126.  See Milgram, supra note 97, at 376-78 (discussing the “sheer strength” of 
obedience as demonstrated by subjects participating in a psychological study); Dallas, supra 
note 99, at 34-35 (concluding that outcome-based reward systems are less likely than 
behavior-based systems to be associated with ethical decision-making); supra note 97 and 
accompanying text (emphasizing the extent to which people are obedient, especially in 
group settings); supra text note 99  and accompanying text (explaining the likelihood that 
reward systems that ignore how goals are achieved contribute to unethical behavior). 
   127.    STANLEY REED & ALISON FITZGERALD, IN TOO DEEP:  BP AND THE DRILLING RACE 
THAT TOOK IT DOWN 142 (2011) (noting that “Hayward paired his stress on safety with a 
brutal cost-cutting drive.”). 
 128.  ABRAHM LUSTGARTEN, RUN TO FAILURE:  BP AND THE MAKING OF THE DEEPWATER 
HORIZON DISASTER 69-81 (2012); REED & FITZGERALD, supra note 127, at 137-73. 
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compliance goals and tie executive compensation to achieving them.
129
 
How corporations train their employees regarding legal requirements 
is a third factor relevant in assessing corporate ethos.
130
  It is important to 
note what steps the corporation has taken in educating its employees about 
such requirements and ethical expectations.
131
 This includes whether a 
company has adopted mission statements, corporate codes of conduct, or 
specific training initiatives, and if these policies are consistent with its 
informal, and formal, cultures.  Are these efforts engrained in the fiber of 
the corporation or mere posturing?
132
  Making this determination is difficult 
and requires attention to other factors, including a corporation’s use of 
monitoring mechanisms and other preventative measures.
133
 
A fourth factor to consider in analyzing corporate ethos is how the 
corporation responded to allegations of criminal behavior in the past.
134
  
How seriously did corporate officials investigate previous claims?  
Indifference or denial can be a sign that misconduct has been recklessly 
tolerated previously.  In addition, how corporate leaders have responded to 
prior allegations of misconduct is telling.  Returning to the BP example, the 
year before the Deepwater Horizon spill, the corporation faced problems in 
Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, and at their Texas City oil refinery.
135
  Arguably, 
both problems were exacerbated if not caused by BP’s extreme focus on 
cost-cutting.
136
  However, even after both the Prudhoe Bay oil spill and the 
Texas City oil refinery explosions, no changes were made.
137
  This spoke 
volumes about BP’s corporate ethos, and communicated to employees that 
regardless of what leaders claimed regarding safety, cost-cutting was their 
priority.  Similarly, it is well known that before the mismanagement that 
eventually forced Enron into bankruptcy, the company had faced several 
instances of misconduct, most notably the Valhalla affair.
138
  In the wake of 
 
 129.  See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 42, at 1448 (suggesting that “directors’ and officers’ 
compensation should reflect, in part, the achievement of particular compliance goals.”).   
 130.  Bucy, supra note 16, at 1134-35.   
 131.  Badarraco & Webb, supra note 109, at 23-25 (concluding that corporate codes and 
training programs are useful elements of formal culture, but insufficient if they are not 
complemented by actions that reflect the informal culture).  Cf. Kennedy, supra note 114, at 
10-11 (arguing that despite good intentions, corporate codes are often minimalist, public 
relations stunts, and unsuccessful but acknowledging that ethics statements have some 
value).  
 132.  Kennedy, supra note 114, at 11.   
 133.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 172-73; Skupski, supra note 26, at 290.   
   134.    Bucy, supra 16, at 1138. 
   135.    REED & FITZGERALD, supra note 127, at 114. 
   136.    Id. at 123. 
 137.  LUSTGARTEN, supra note 128, at 278-79; REED & FITZGERALD, supra note 127 at 
118-25.   
   138. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:  THE 
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that incident, however, no one was punished or fired.
139
  It is easy to 
imagine how employees interpreted Kenneth Lay’s response to the fraud, 
especially to the announcement that the wrongdoers “made too much 
money to let them go.”
140
 
A fifth factor to use in examining corporate ethos is a company’s 
compensation scheme, and especially, what the company rewards and 
punishes.
141
  Not only do people act in ways that seek reward and avoid 
punishment, they watch how others’ behavior is received.
142
  Finally, an 
additional consideration in evaluating corporate ethos is the breadth of a 
business’s indemnification policies.
143
   
The corporate ethos model is not without its critics.  Corporate ethos 
has been called imprecise because it provides a list of relevant factors, but 
fails to offer any guidance on how to weigh these factors in determining 
liability.
144
  It also has been suggested that corporate ethos fails to establish 
at what point the corporate culture encouraged employee misconduct to a 
degree sufficient to impose criminal liability.
145
  Finally, critics have 
suggested that if the corporate ethos model were adopted, the mens rea 
requirement would be all but eliminated.
146
  A potential consequence of this 
change could include imposition of liability on corporations where 
individual actors did not realize that their seemingly innocent actions, 
coupled with those of other employees, contributed to the commission of a 
crime.
147
 
Nevertheless, we believe that the corporate ethos model is preferable 
to respondeat superior, because it better fulfills the public policy objectives 
 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 15-17 (2003). 
   139.    Id.  
 140.  Id. at 21-24. 
   141.    Bucy, supra note 16, at 1139. 
 142.  TREVIÑO & NELSON, supra note 96, at 260-61. 
 143.  Bucy, supra note 16, at 1140-46.   
 144.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 300 (“[I]t fails to provide sufficiently concrete and 
predictable guidance as to how the variables contributing to an ethos are weighed in making 
the liability determination.”).   
 145.  Skupski, supra note 26, at 300 (“More importantly, it fails to clarify the appropriate 
threshold beyond which it may be said that those variables actually encourage specific 
criminal violations requiring various mens rea for conviction, and how this threshold 
correlates with the mens rea in the statute at issue.”).   
 146.  William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 673 
(1994) (arguing that corporate ethos and similar models “are models of organizational 
liability, rather than culpability . . . .”).  We would suggest that adopting the corporate ethos 
model does not eliminate the mens rea requirement, but instead shifts the focus from the 
mind of the individual to the mind of the corporation.   
 147.  Kircher, supra note 19, at 171-72.  By contrast, corporate ethos would prevent a 
corporation from escaping liability where its culture encourages misconduct even if no one 
individual can be deemed criminally responsible. Kircher, supra note 19, at 172.  
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of criminal law.  Under corporate ethos, criminal liability promotes the goal 
of retribution, as it is based on the corporate actor’s conduct and 
blameworthiness.
148
  Liability is imposed where there is consensus that a 
corporate culture evidences a corporate character that deserves punishment 
and scorn.  In addition, by distinguishing between formal and informal 
culture, corporate ethos provides incentives for corporations to adopt and 
enforce effective compliance programs, thereby serving a general deterrent 
function.
149
  
Moreover, the corporate ethos model is not under or over-inclusive.  
One of the major criticisms of criminal liability under respondeat superior 
is that a corporation can be liable despite its reasonable efforts to deter 
criminal conduct by its agents.
150
  As a result, under respondeat superior, 
there is little a corporation can do to protect itself from the consequences of 
a rogue employee’s actions.  Imposing liability in such cases fails to deter 
or punish.  It does not inhibit similar conduct because the company was 
never in the position to prevent the original incident.  In addition, punishing 
a corporation for the acts of a rogue employee cannot deter similar 
violations at other companies, as they are equally powerless to control such 
actors.  Indeed, punishing a corporation that has done all it could to prevent 
misconduct violates the basic tenet of criminal law, of punishing the 
reprehensible.  Respondeat superior’s exclusive focus on the individual 
actor means corporations are punished whenever their employees commit a 
crime within the scope of their employment, regardless of a company’s 
sincere efforts to prevent such actions.  The corporate ethos model, in 
contrast, would absolve a corporation of any criminal liability for the 
actions of a rogue employee. 
Respondeat superior has been criticized as being under-inclusive 
because if a specific employee who has committed an illegal act cannot be 
found, the corporation escapes liability.
151
 By focusing on the isolated 
 
 148.  Corporate ethos shifts the focus from the wrongful conduct of an individual to the 
culpable conduct of the organization as evidenced by its culture.  Under this theory, 
“individual acts should only be considered relevant insofar as they express a certain kind of 
organizational attitude that makes it possible for us to attribute responsibility to the 
corporation.”  Diez, supra note 81, at 81.  Imposition of criminal liability thereby “‘sends 
the message’ that people matter more than profits and reaffirms the value of those who were 
sacrificed to ‘corporate greed.’”  Kahan, supra note 18, at 619.   
 149.  Vu, supra note 49, at 489 (“It follows, from the economic axiom that corporations 
seek to maximize profit, that only with monetary liability for the actions of its employees 
does the corporation incur any incentive to use its position to prevent employee crime.”).  
Stacy Neumann Vu argues how, considering the marginal cost to a corporation of 
preventing or forgoing crime, imposition of criminal liability can serve as an effective 
deterrent.  Vu, supra note 49, at 489-90.   
   150.    See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
   151.    See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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wrongdoer, respondeat superior fails to recognize corporate culture’s 
influence on individual conduct. In contrast, the corporate ethos model 
addresses this concern. 
Finally, it should be noted that traditionally, corporate culture is 
considered only during sentencing.
152
 Restricting evidence of corporate 
culture to this late stage in a proceeding, results in over-inclusive 
convictions. Many scholars have proposed that corporate defenders should 
be able to present evidence of an effective compliance program as a 
defense to a criminal charge.
153
  For practical purposes, there might be little 
difference (except for burden of proof issues) between basing the prima 
facie case upon a showing of an organizational culture that encouraged 
illegal activity, and allowing a corporation to use a culture that fosters legal 
behavior as an affirmative defense. 
II. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AND THE LIMITS OF EXISTING REGULATION
154
 
CRA behavior prior to the GFC illustrates respondeat superior’s 
inadequacies in addressing corporate criminal behavior.  In Part II, we will 
highlight the weaknesses of the existing regulation of CRAs, including 
enhanced civil liability, and the important role that criminal liability can 
play in improving current policy.  CRAs provide valuable information that 
can enhance investors’ decision-making and redress the knowledge 
asymmetry inherent in investment choices.  Because CRAs are charged 
with using their expertise to protect the public as well as investors, they 
have an obligation to ensure the accuracy of the ratings they assign.  
Unfortunately, there is substantial evidence that prior to the GFC, CRAs 
failed to fulfill this duty, and instead played an instrumental role in 
allowing the GFC to unfold. 
In many ways, the GFC began with a housing boom. Low interest 
rates, especially interest rates that were low in the early years of adjustable 
rate mortgages, lead to an increased demand for housing and to an 
 
   152.    See supra text accompanying note 64. 
   153.    See, e.g., Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a 
Defense to Criminal Liability:  Can a Corporation Save its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 
676-78 (1995) (arguing that a corporation’s comprehensive compliance program should be a 
defense to criminal liability as it is consistent with the principle that punishment requires 
proof of intent, and ultimately would benefit the corporate community and general public).   
   154.    Part  II, supra notes 155-204 and accompanying text, relies in large part on an an a 
prior article that discusses the problems associated with attaching civil liability to CRAs. 
See Ellis et al., supra note 12. We would like to thank both Professors D’Souza and 
Fairchild for their work and words. 
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unprecedented appreciation in home prices.
155
  Most importantly, 
mortgages on homes were securitized.
156
 This means that they were 
bundled, placed in special purpose vehicles (SPVs), and sold as CDOs with 
the mortgages as collateral.
157
 More importantly, this meant that the 
originators who created the mortgages did not bear the risk of default.  This 
created pressure to issue more mortgages
158
 and resulted in mortgages 
being extended to people who otherwise would not have qualified.
159
  
 
 155.  Much of this analysis has been outlined in previous work.  See generally Ellis, 
Fairchild & D’Souza, supra note 11 (analyzing the conflicts of interest inherent in the CRA 
model and how those conflicts incentivized inaccurate ratings that contributed to the GFC); 
Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 
N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 43-44 (2009) (discussing the incentives for a “quick payday” 
resulting in a structure that valued the number of mortgages closed, rather than borrowers’ 
ability to repay borrowed funds).  
 156.  See Dennis, supra note 7, at 1118-22 (tracing the development of mortgage-backed 
securities and the riskier private market for these securities that evolved outside of the 
constraints imposed by government-sponsored enterprises); see also Richard E. Mendales, 
Collateralized Explosive Devices:  Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO 
Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1364-68 (2009) (describing the 
history and growth of the asset-backed securities market, including mortgage-backed 
securities).  The practice of securitization became so prevalent that over two-thirds of all 
mortgages were securitized in 2005.  Nicole B. Neuman, A “Sarbanes-Oxley” for Credit 
Rating Agencies?:  A Comparison of the Roles Auditors’ and Credit Rating Agencies’ 
Conflicts of Interests Played in Recent Financial Crises, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 921, 924 
(2010).  This contrasts with less than twenty percent of mortgages that were securitized in 
1999.  Neuman, supra at 924. 
 157.  Moran, supra note 155, at 33-34; Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, The Promise 
and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2007); see also, Lynch, 
supra note 11, at 232 (describing the assistance of mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations in slowing down the economy due to their complex 
structure).  
 158.  Damon Silvers & Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of Deregulation and the Financial 
Crisis—Linkages Between Deregulation in Labor Markets, Housing Finance Markets, and 
the Broader Financial Markets, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 301, 303 (2009).  As MBSs were 
repackaged for more than their underlying value, there was additional pressure to both 
originate new mortgages, and to create and sell additional derivatives.  Claire A. Hill, Why 
Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 
585, 590 (2010) (“[W]ith someone to sell the loans to, lenders discovered a new enthusiasm 
for making them.”); Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of 
the Crisis, supra note 4, at 5 (“These transactions, too, persisted over time, so much so that 
the appetite for second-level mortgage securitizations drove financial intermediaries both to 
originate new and increasingly risky mortgages, and to create synthetic exposure to 
mortgages, which then could be resecuritized through tranched special purpose entities, 
again at higher prices than the underlying mortgage-backed securities were trading in the 
market.”).  
 159.  Mortgage originators became lax with respect to credit checks of applicants, and 
loans were often extended without verifying an applicant’s income, employment, or assets. 
John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 403, 
406 (2009) (“[S]ecuritization led to lax screening by the loan originator.”).  The no doc 
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Because the purchasers of these securities lacked information about 
the underlying assets, their marketability was wholly dependent upon the 
rating assigned by CRAs.
160
  For example, investors knew nothing about 
 
loans often led to fraudulent loan applications, some of which were termed “‘liar’ loans.”  
Mendales, supra note 156, at 1394-95 (quoting In re Hill, No. 07-41137, 2008 WL 2227359 
at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 23, 2008).  Moreover, the numbers of such loans grew.  Darcy, 
supra note 11, at 614-15 (“In 2001, 28.5% of subprime borrowers could not verify 
information about employment, income, or other credit-related data.  This figure increased 
to nearly 51% in 2006.”) (internal footnotes omitted).  Subprime lending became the norm.  
Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The Subprime Credit Crisis of 
07 4 (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112467 (“By 2006, 
subprime mortgages represented 13% of all outstanding mortgage loans with origination of 
subprime mortgages representing 20% of new residential mortgages compared to the 
historical average of approximately 8%.”).  The origination-securitization frenzy sparked the 
classic asset price bubble, which caused credit standards to ease as lenders became “less 
concerned about the ability of the borrowers to repay loans and instead rely on further 
appreciation of the asset to shield themselves from losses.”  Unterman, supra note 8, at 54 
(quoting Frederic S. Mishkin, How should we respond to asset price bubbles, FEDERAL 
RESERVE, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
miskiin20080515a.htm); see also Matthews, supra note 7, at 251 (“[S]ecuritization 
encouraged origination volume over quality . . . .”); Mendales, supra note 156, at 1393 
(“This led to a vicious circle like those seen in prior bubbles, in which the greater 
availability of mortgages increased the demand for homes, pushing up the prices at which 
they were sold and in turn pushing up the amounts lent to their purchasers.”); Brooke A. 
Murphy, Credit Rating Immunity? How the Hands-Off Approach Toward Credit Rating 
Agencies Led to the Subprime Credit Crisis and the Need for Greater Accountability, 62 
OKLA. L. REV. 735, 739 (2010) (“In an attempt to keep up with the high demand for 
RMBSs, mortgage lenders began implementing increasingly unsound lending practices, 
which allowed more people to qualify for home mortgages, thereby generating more 
mortgages and RMBSs.”); David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess:  The New 
Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 712 (2009) (characterizing this 
as a typical bubble, like a Ponzi scheme in which “nobody gets hurt” as the bubble is 
forming, followed by the “necessary reckoning – the collapse of prices.”).   
 160.  See Coffee, supra note 159, at 409 (“In overview, investment banks bought 
unsound loans because they knew they could securitize them on a global basis if – and only 
if – they could obtain investment-grade ratings from major credit rating agencies.  Without 
that rating, the debt was unmarketable.”); White, supra note 3, at 13 (“And crucial to the 
ability of these packages to sell the securities was the process of obtaining favorable ratings 
on the securities.”).  Ratings are particularly important in the case of structured financial 
transactions such as those discussed here.  Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 
82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 49 (2004)(“[A] structured finance transaction will almost never go 
forward unless some of the securities sold in the transaction achieve a high investment grade 
rating.”); Matthews, supra note 7, at 250 (“With respect to structured finance issuances, 
however, the CRA rating takes on a gatekeeper role akin to audits and analyses performed in 
connection with equity financings because informational asymmetry hampers an investor’s 
effective evaluation of underlying mortgage pools.”).  Due to the importance of credit 
ratings to structured finance products, Frank Partnoy has concluded that “the agencies have 
become more like ‘gate openers’ than gatekeepers.”  Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit 
Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers 60 (U. San Diego Sch. of Law, Research 
Paper No. 07-46, 2006), available at http;//ssrn.com/abstract=900257.   
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the quality of the underlying assets, had no way to obtain that information 
and were therefore unable to evaluate the likelihood of default of the 
mortgages within the pool.
161
  Therefore, investors’ only option was to rely 
on the CRA’s assessment of the credit risk of the investment.
162
  Moreover, 
the complexity of the derivatives made it difficult for even sophisticated 
investors to properly assess their credit risk.
 163
 
Had CRA analysis accurately reflected the riskiness of these CDOs 
and rated them accordingly, this would have prevented the bubble from 
expanding.  Instead, CRAs rated them highly, even those largely comprised 
of subprime mortgages.
164
 Much of the criticism surrounding CRA 
performance has centered on the statistical models used to measure the 
 
 161.  Crouhy, et al., supra note 159, at 9 (“Investors in complex credit products had 
considerably less information at their disposal to assess the underlying credit quality of the 
assets they held in their portfolios than the originators.”); Partnoy, Overdependence on 
Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, supra note 4, at 6 (“Investors typically 
did not examine the underlying assets of a synthetic CDO or SIV in any detail or at all.  One 
might criticize them for not doing so, except that the underlying assets were frequently not 
even specified when the deal was sold.”).  CalPers has alleged in its lawsuit that “Other than 
the Rating Agencies’ evaluation and subsequent credit rating of an SIV, an investor had no 
access to any information upon which to base a judgment of a SIV’s creditworthiness.”  
CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 19.  Jerome S. Fons, former Managing Director at 
Moody’s, explains, “[i]nvestors rely on agency ratings when making purchase decisions 
because of the opacity . . . . Moreover, the tools to analyze credit risk, even with transparent 
assets, are beyond the grasp of many investors.”  Jerome S. Fons, WHITE PAPER ON RATING 
COMPETITION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.fonsrisksolutions.com/Documents/Ratings%20White%20Paper.pdf. 
 162.  See Coffee, supra note 159, at 404 (“[T]his financial technology depended very 
heavily on gatekeepers – that is, on professionals that investors trust to do what investors 
cannot do for themselves.”); Lisbeth Freeman, Who’s Guarding the Gate? Credit-Rating 
Agency Liability as “Control Persons” in the Subprime Credit Crisis, 33 VT. L. REV. 585, 
591 (2009) (“Mortgage-backed securities, though, contain special features that distinguish 
them from conventional investment bonds and make accurate valuation a more difficult task 
for investment professionals.”). 
 163.  Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory Investigations and 
the Credit Crisis:  The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 228 (2009) (“The 
financial instruments and arrangements at issue in the credit crisis investigations are highly 
complex.”); Hill, supra note 158 at 590 (“[T]hese structures are highly complex and, 
ultimately, not well understood.”); Moran, supra note 155, at 40 (“[A]s very complex 
instruments, even the most sophisticated investors sometimes fail to appreciate their risks 
and substitute the rating supplied by the credit rating agency for the investors’ own 
independent risk analysis.”). 
 164.  In many ways, “[t]he essential question . . . is how loans to individuals with poor 
credit histories (which often originated without credit checks or down-payments) were 
transformed into investments that the market trusted as being as reliable as government 
securities.”  Unterman, supra note 8, at 58.  John C. Coffee, Jr. opines that “the true mystery 
here is not why loan originators made unsound loans, but why investment banks bought 
them.”  Coffee, supra note 159, at 408.  This can be attributed to the favorable ratings 
assigned by the CRAs to CDOs and other asset-backed securities.   
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likelihood of default in each tranche.
165
 Unfortunately, CRAs issued these 
ratings relying on historical default and recovery data even when the pool 
consisted of newly issued mortgages with no payment history.
166
  In 
addition, CRA models were based on optimistic assumptions regarding the 
continued appreciation of housing prices and borrower defaults.
167
  The 
models were not modified as housing and credit market conditions changed 
 
 165.  The SPV was typically divided into three tranches.  John Crawford, Hitting the 
Sweet Spot by Accident:  How Recent Lower Court Cases Help Realign Incentives in the 
Credit Rating Industry, 42 CONN. L. REV. 13, 16 (2009); Lynch, supra note 11, at 264.  
Arguably, the use of quantitative models is more important in the rating of structured 
financial products than in the case of corporate debt ratings.  Crouhy, et al., supra note 159, 
at 28 (“[T]he rating of CDO tranches relies heavily on quantitative models while corporate 
debt ratings rely essentially on the analyst judgment.”).   
 166.   See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators:  Hearing before the 
Comm. of Gov’t Oversight and Reform, 110th Cong. 3-4 (2008) (statement of Alan 
Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve) (“The whole intellectual edifice 
[underpinning the advances in derivatives markets] . . . collapsed in the summer of last year 
because the data inputted into the risk management models generally covered only the past 
two decades, a period of euphoria.  Instead the model has been fitted more appropriately to 
historic periods of stress, capital requirements would have been much higher and the 
financial world would be in far better shape today . . . .”); Dennis, supra note 7, at 1123-25 
(discussing problems with relying on historical data to rate MBSs comprised of subprime 
mortgage pools); Lupica, supra note 6, at 659 (“[T]he mathematical models commonly used 
reflected risk based on short-term, rather than long-term historical data.”); Murphy, supra 
note 159, at 747-48 (“[M]any of the risk assumptions made by the NRSROs were based on 
historical records rather than current data.  The NRSROs’ models, therefore, did not 
sufficiently account for the riskier form of loans that were being generated, such as 
adjustable rate loans and ‘no income, no asset’ loans.”) (internal footnotes omitted); 
Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, supra note 
4, at 4 (“[I]n the early 2000s, rating agency models, and assumptions about historical 
default, recovery, and correlation, suggested that extant mortgage-backed securities could be 
repackaged and resold in ways that would outperform, not only the mortgage-backed 
securities themselves, but other comparably rated securities.”); see also Darcy, supra note 
11, at 636-37 (discussing the fact that subprime mortgage loans performed strongly between 
2001 and 2005.).  Therefore, models that relied on historical data underestimated the risk of 
default.  Relying on historical data resulted in a failure to differentiate between times of 
housing appreciation as compared with depreciation. In times of housing appreciation, 
borrowers who could not pay simply sold their houses rather than defaulting, making 
resulting default rates a bad predictor of default during a period of housing depreciation.   
 167.  Crawford, supra note 165, at 16 (“In hindsight, the rating agencies fed the models 
unrealistically optimistic assumptions about continuing house price appreciation, the 
probability of borrower defaults, and correlations among defaults.”) (internal footnotes 
omitted); Murphy, supra note 159 at 747 (quoting The Role and Impact of Credit Rating 
Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 74, 77 (2007) (prepared statement of Michael 
Kanef, Group Managing Director, Moody’s Investors Service) (“[T]he models used did not 
address basic and crucial issues related ‘to the investment decision process, including the 
price, term, likelihood of prepayment, liquidity risk or relative valuation of particular 
securities.’”)). 
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significantly.
168
  In fact, even as the GFC began, CRAs failed to promptly 
downgrade the ratings of troubled securities.
169
  Moreover, the CRAs often 
failed to conduct any independent due diligence, instead relying on the 
information provided to them by the issuers.
170
  Since the complexity of the 
CDOs being issued made them difficult to understand, the CRAs often 
were unable to judge the value of the investment.
171
  This meant that as the 
instruments’ complexity increased, the financial sophistication needed to 
accurately rate them also increased, and some CRA analysts simply lacked 
the expertise needed to properly do so.
172
  In addition, there is evidence that 
 
 168.  Dennis, supra note 7, at 1123-26; Mendales, supra note 133, at 1380; Moran, supra 
note 155, at 48-50.  In fact, as housing prices began to fall and the models used to rate the 
MBSs did not reflect this decline, securitization became more attractive.  Partnoy, 
Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, supra note 4, at 7:  
Paradoxically, when housing prices began to fall but ratings on first-level securitizations did 
not, the historical rating methodology made second-level securitizations increasingly 
attractive.  If one could buy AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities that had fallen in price, 
but still use the same historical default, recovery, and correlation assumptions associated 
with AAA ratings in the relevant model, one could create a highly rated, high-yielding set of 
second-level transactions.   
 169.  Ceresney, et al., supra note 163, at 265 (The CRAs “were too slow in correcting 
the excessively high ratings that had been placed on many cases of bonds backed by 
subprime mortgages during the housing boom.”) (internal footnote omitted); Krebs, supra 
note 5, at 137 (noting that “in the ensuing economic downturn, the agencies failed to 
promptly downgrade troubled securities’ ratings and companies’ ratings . . . .”) (internal 
footnote omitted).   
 170.  Lupica, supra note 6, at 656 (“Rating agencies have been criticized for not 
conducting independent diligence in connection with their structured securities rating 
analysis.”) (internal footnote omitted); Moran, supra note 155, at 49 (discussing CRA 
claims that they had no responsibility to evaluate the quality of the bundled mortgages).  For 
example, CRAs failed to even check for the adequate documentation of each mortgage.  
There is some evidence that the issuers actually refused to provide the requested relevant 
data.  For example, one Moody analyst reported asking for the data necessary to assess the 
creditworthiness of underlying mortgages and being told, “[a]ny request for loan level tapes 
is TOTALLY UNREASONABLE!!!”  Hill, supra note 158 at 592 (internal footnote 
omitted); see also Ceresney, et al., supra note 163, at 265 (“[I]ndustry practice was to give 
the rating agencies only limited information, while the most detailed date concerning loan 
pools were not disclosed.”) (internal footnote omitted); Class Action Complaint at 1, First 
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Rochelle Ill. v. McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., No. 13CH16154 (Cir. Ct. 
of Cook County, Ill. July 3, 2013) [hereinafter First Nat’l Complaint], available at 
http://www.talcottfranklin.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/FNB.pdf (quoting a 
statement by the Senior Managing Director at Moody’s that it is the issuer’s job to verify the 
accuracy of the information furnished to the CRAs).   
 171.  Lupica, supra note 6, at 649 (“A central failing of the market is directly tied to the 
‘too-clever-by-half’ structure of many of these complex transactions:  few truly understood 
these transactions, the nature of the investments being sold, and how to evaluate the risk 
associated with the underlying assets.” (quoting Chain of Fools, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 9th-
15th , 2008, at 84)); Moran, supra note 155, at 40 (“The complexity of CDOs often rendered 
them opaque even to the credit rating agencies, making the ratings suspect.”).   
 172.  See, e.g., Hill, supra note 160, at 81 (“[T]he rating agencies’ level of financial 
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CRAs were inadequately staffed especially given the increased business 
that resulted from the housing bubble
173
 
It is unclear exactly why the CRAs failed to accurately rate these 
CDOs.  Some have argued that they relied too heavily on their models and 
failed to take relevant subjective factors into consideration.
174
  It is hard to 
accept the argument that CRAs exhibited “plain bad judgment”
175
 in light 
of evidence that they actually lowered loss estimates in some instances and 
issued higher ratings than were justified even by their own models.
176
  
Some have argued that they were influenced by the fact that issuing firms 
in some instances were paying the CRA a separate feel to design the 
securities they would eventually rate.
177
 
 
sophistication did not rise with the level of things about which they had to become 
sophisticated . . . .”).   
 173.  Mendales, supra note 156, at 1380 (“[I]n the increasing frenzy of the housing 
bubble, credit analysts at the rating agencies cut more corners as the volume of issues 
exceeded their capacity to examine offerings presented to them for analysis.”).  The SEC 
Summary Report concludes that ratings were issued in spite of inadequate staffing, who in 
many cases lacked the expertise to deal with the complexity of the structured financial 
instruments being rated; models that admittedly did not capture risk well.  SEC, SUMMARY 
REPORT OF THE ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008) at 12, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/ 
craexamination070808.pdf [hereinafter Summary Report]. 
 174.  Lupica, supra note 6, at 661 (“[R]eliance on ‘math’ to the exclusion of 
consideration of subjective factors impacting credit quality such as the issuer’s management 
quality, competitive market position, financial policy, capital structure, cash flow protection, 
accounting practices, and the general economic environment led to inaccurate conclusions 
about levels of risk.  Analysts cast aside their judgment in favor of the illusion of an 
objective risk numerical.”  (internal footnotes omitted)). 
 175.  Ceresney, et al., supra note 163, at 228 (“In many of the areas being investigated, 
there simply may not have been intentional misconduct or criminally reckless behavior, but 
rather plain bad judgment on the part of market actors.”).   
 176.  Dennis, supra note 7, at 1138 (describing an SEC report which found “that one 
agency regularly lowered the loss estimates that were indicated by their statistical models 
and did not disclose this practice.”) (internal footnote omitted)  
 177.  Michael C. Ehrhardt & Eugene F. Brigham stated: 
  
Rating agencies were paid to investigate the details of each bond and to 
assign a rating which reflected the security’s risk. The securitizing firms 
paid the rating agencies to do the ratings.  For example, Lehman 
Brothers hired Moody’s to rate some of their CDOs.  Indeed, the 
investment banks would actually pay for advice from the rating 
agencies as they were designing the securities.  The rating and 
consulting activities were extremely lucrative for the agencies, which 
ignored the obvious conflict of interest:  The investment bank wanted a 
high rating, the rating agency got paid to help design securities that 
would qualify for a high rating, and high ratings led to continued 
business for the raters. 
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Given the pivotal role that CRAs play in assuring the smooth 
functioning of credit markets, one might expect that they would be subject 
to significant regulation. The opposite is, in fact, true.  Historically, CRAs 
have been largely self-regulated. 
178
 Under the reputational capital theory, it 
is thought that an agency’s interest in maintaining a reputation for issuing 
accurate ratings is a sufficient incentive to ensure reliable ratings.
179
 Hence, 
regulation is unnecessary becasuse CRAs are motivated to provide accurate 
ratings gain the economic benefit that results from a reputation for 
accuracy.
180
 
Largely because of this belief, CRAs continued to be unregulated until 
 
Michael C. Ehrhardt & Eugene F. Brigham, CORPORATE FINANCE:  A FOCUSED APPROACH 
40 (4th ed. 2009); Coffee, supra note 159 at 410 (“These investment banks are repeat 
players, who also hire the rating agency as their consultant to teach them the rating agency’s 
own methodology and thus help them design a product that can get an investment-grade 
rating.”); Krebs, supra note 5, at 139 (“[T]he rating companies profited by advising issuers 
on how to squeeze the most profit out of these securities by maximizing the ratings on 
tranches.”); Lynch, supra note 11, at 280 (“[I]ssuers typically consulted and worked directly 
with the credit rating analysts to find out how their MBSs and other asset backed securities 
could be structured to obtain the highest rating for the largest possible pieces of the asset 
pool . . . .”); Murphy, supra note 159 at 746 (describing how the “issuer is then given an 
opportunity to restructure the subordination scheme of the RMBS in order for the highest 
tranche to receive the most elevated rating.  In restructuring the RMBS, the NRSRO actively 
advises the issuers regarding which structure and which credit enhancements will yield the 
highest rating.”); see also Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 157, at 1044 (“The process of rating 
CDOs becomes a mathematical game that smart bankers know they win.  A person who 
understands the details of the model can tweak the inputs, assumptions, and underlying 
assets to produce a CDO that appears to add value, when in reality it does not.”).   
 178.   The industry relies largely on self-regulation.  Amadou N.R. Sy, The Systemic 
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper WP/09/129, 2009) available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf.   
 179.   Dennis, supra note 7, at 1114 (“The dominant view concerning regulation of the 
rating agencies is based upon the ‘reputational-capital’ theory, which holds that an agency’s 
success is primarily a result of the agency’s track record in issuing accurate ratings.”); 
Krebs, supra note 5, at 134 (“This is due to the thought that any resulting reputational 
damage from non-neutral opinions would severely damage long-term profitability, in 
exchange for mere short-term profits.”).  Rating agencies are thought to “prosper based on 
their ability to acquire and retain reputational capital” and trust.  Frank Partnoy, The 
Paradox of Credit Ratings 4 (U. of San Diego Sch. Of Law, Research Paper No. 20, 2001) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=285162.  According to Frank Partnoy, in order 
for a credit rating to be credible to third parties, the CRA must have reputational capital at 
stake.  Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, 
supra note 4, at 2 (“In other words, the certifying agent credibly must be able to pledge that 
it will suffer a loss, related either to litigation or declining reputation, if its certification is 
systematically biased or false.”). 
 180.   Rousseau, supra note 3, at 637-38 (“If a CRA has a reputation for erratic or biased 
analysis, investors will discount the value of the ratings assigned.  If investors doubt the 
accuracy or independence of the ratings of a particular CRA, issuers will seek a more 
credible agency to signal their creditworthiness.”).   
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the passage of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA).
181
  
The CRARA provides limited regulation. Its primary focus was to increase 
competition among CRAs,
182
 address potential conflicts of interest, and 
encourage transparency and disclosure.
183
 Under the CRARA a CRA can 
become a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). 
NRSROs are required to disclose the general methods they use for rating as 
part of the registration process, but are subject to little monitoring.
184
  
Moreover, the CRARA does not require that a CRA employ credible 
performance measurement models or methodologies.
185
  
A. Statutory Liability 
In instances of limited degree of nature of regulatory oversight, it is 
 
 181.   15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7 (2006); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its 
Discontents:   The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 
1674 (2008) (“[I]n 2006 federal legislation imposed a small measure of regulatory oversight 
on rating agencies, which until then were essentially unregulated.”); Mendales, supra note 
156, at 1375 (“[T]he rating agencies . . . were largely unregulated until 2006 . . . .”).   
 182.   See Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly:  The Case of Enron, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2003) (arguing that the credit rating industry is a highly 
concentrated oligopoly, and that three main competitors dominate the global marketplace by 
controlling ninety-eight percent of total ratings assigned worldwide – Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch.); see also Krebs, supra note 5, at 136 (“Moody’s and S. & P. are the 
largest, with each respectively owning about forty percent of the credit rating markets.”); 
Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F:   How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed America and 
What can be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2009 asserting that the 
“Big Three” credit rating agencies issue ninety-eight percent of the total ratings) (citation 
omitted).  
 183.   Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty, 
35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61, 69 (2009) (“CRARA is a modest piece of legislation that seeks to 
solve these intractable problems through increased competition and disclosure.”); Mendy 
Piekarski, Rating Agency Accountability, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 272, 278-80 (2008) 
(discussing the purpose of the then draft version of CRARA and the proposed disclosure 
requirements); see also Freeman, supra note 162, at 599 (2009) (maintaining that the 
CRARA was enacted, at least in part, in response to concerns about CRA failures in 
accurately rating and downgrading Enron.).  
 184.   See Hill, supra note 160, at 44 (“Favorable treatment for securities highly rated by 
NRSROs is the principal feature of the regulatory regime; the NRSROs themselves are not 
subject to substantive monitoring.”); see also Mendales, supra note 156, at 1386 (“CRARA 
requires an agency to discuss its general methods and procedures in its registration 
application, but does not require it to disclose the data underlying its statistical models or 
other aspects of its methodology as applied to individual securities being rated.”).   
 185.   See Lynch, supra note 11, at 268 (arguing that CRAs are not required to disclose 
the data underlying the statistical models employed or other facts relevant to the 
methodology adopted to rate the CDOs, and noting that the CRARA actually prohibits the 
SEC from regulating any aspect of the rating process including the methods used by CRAs 
to rate securities); see also, 15 U.S.C.A. §78o-7(c)(2)(2006) (explaining that neither the 
Commission or state may regulate procedures and methodologies of credit ratings).  
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possible for the threat of civil liability to act as an adequate deterrent.
186
 
Such liability can be premised on statute or on common law liability.  In 
the case of CRAs, however, the threat of civil suit has proven to be equally 
ineffective in regulating CRAs.
187
 In fact, CRAs have been largely 
protected from liability under securities laws.  They were expressly 
insulated from liability based on Sections 7 and 11 of the 1933 Securities 
Act because their statements were not considered a part of the registration 
statement.
188
  Therefore, liability can only be imposed on CRAS under 
securities laws where plaintiffs can prove fraud.
189
  Unfortunately, the 
scienter requirement in a securities fraud case has made it difficult to 
impose liability in such cases. 
Recognizing that CRAs perform essential gatekeeper functions that 
are “fundamentally commercial in character and should be subject to the 
same standards of liability and oversight that apply to auditors, securities 
analysts, and investment bankers,”
190
 the newly adopted Dodd-Frank Act 
made a few significant changes with respect to CRA liability. First, Dodd-
Frank provided that CRAs are no longer exempt from Section 11 liability 
 
 186.   See Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 426 
(2007) (arguing that the threat of civil liability can incentivize firms to act as effective 
gatekeepers by “raising the costs of complicity.”). See generally Maas, supra note 35 at 
1023 (arguing for the application of targeted criminal law).   
  187.   Dennis, supra note 7 at 1140-44 (noting and discussing CRA’s ability to “avoid[] 
liability for inaccurate ratings.”); see also Kettering, supra note 181, at 1688 (indicating one 
commentator has remarked that in the few cases brought against CRAs, “the only common 
element . . . is that the rating agencies win.”(quoting Partnoy, supra note 179, at 19)).  See 
generally Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest 
Editorials?:   An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability?  75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 459 
(1990) (explaining that the courts rely on the market to fix cases of negligence and potential 
liability with CRAs, not their own judicial system).  
 188.  Rule 436(g)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (repealed 2010), 17 C.F.R. 
§230.436(g)(1)(2003) (“[T]he security rating assigned to a class of debt securities, a class of 
convertible debt securities, or a class of preferred stock by a nationally recognized statistical 
rating organization . . . shall not be considered a part of the registration statement prepared 
or certified by a person within the meaning of sections 7 and 11 of the Act.”).  
 189. Kettering, supra note 181, at 1689.  See also John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating 
Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”:   The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency 
of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 190-95 (2009) 
(discussing liability for security fraud including various suits stemming from the GFC.)   
      190.  Dodd-Frank, § 931 (3) (2010).  This basic premise is clearly set forth in the 
Statute: 
(1) IN GENERAL. – The enforcement and penalty provisions of this 
chapter shall apply to statements made by a credit rating agency in the 
same manner and to the same extent as such provisions apply to 
statements made by a registered public accounting firm or a securities 
analyst under the securities laws . . . . 
 
Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1) (2010). 
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for misstatements in the registration statements. Instead, CRAs would be 
treated like other experts and face liability for misstatements or omissions 
in the registration statement.  They can overcome this liability by showing 
that they met their due diligence requirement.  An expert can meet its due 
diligence defense by showing that it “had, after reasonable investigation, 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe” that there were no 
misstatements or omissions of material facts in the portions of the 
registration statement he expertized.
191
  Thus, under Dodd-Frank a CRA 
can avoid liability under Section 11 only by demonstrating that it made a 
reasonable investigation and that based on that investigation, it had 
reasonable grounds to believe that its ratings were accurate. 
192
 
Second, Section 933 of Dodd-Frank specifically addresses CRA 
liability in its amendment of the state of mind requirement of Section 21D 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In securities fraud cases, liability 
can only be imposed if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted with 
a “particular state of mind.”
193
 Subsection (2) provides that this state of 
mind requirement is met when a CRA recklessly or knowingly failed to 
conduct a reasonable investigation or failed to obtain a reasonable 
verification of facts provided by third parties.
194
 
In spite of the changes imposed by the language of Dodd-Frank, it is 
unlikely that a CRA will face liabilitly under the securities laws.  Section 
11 provides that experts have liability only if they consent to have their 
expert opinions be part of the registration statement.
195
 After Dodd-Frank 
 
 191. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i). 
 192. See generally William K. Sjostrom, The Due Diligence Defense Under Section 11 
of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS L. J. 459 (2006) (discussing the reasonable 
investigation standard, as established by case law and the SEC’s adoption of 17 C.F.R. 
§230.176 (2006)).   
      193.  See Dodd Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2010) 
     194.  Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(B):  
(B) EXCEPTION. – In the case of an action for money damages brought 
against a credit rating agency or a controlling person under this title, it shall 
be sufficient, for purposes of pleading any required state of mind in relation 
to such action, that the complaint state with particularity the facts giving rise 
to a strong inference that the credit rating agency knowingly or recklessly 
failed – 
(i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with 
respect to the faculty elements relied upon by its own methodology for 
evaluating credit risk; or 
(ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements (which 
verification may be based on a sampling technique that does not amount 
to an audit) from other sources that the credit rating agency considered 
to be competent and that were independent of the issuer and 
underwriter. 
 
 195. Sjostrom, supra note 192 at 566.   
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was enacted, CRAs withheld this permission.
196
 The SEC then issued a no-
action letter making it clear that CRAs would not be held liable for Section 
11 misstatements.
197
 
B. Common Law Liability  
A number of cases based on common law have been brought against 
CRAs.  As might be expected, some issuers have alleged that CRA ratings 
were too low and some investors have alleged that the ratings were too 
high.  CRAs have prevailed in most cases for a number of reasons.  First, it 
has been difficult for the plaintiffs to prove the elements necessary for a 
prima facie case.  For example, it is difficult to prove the scienter needed to 
bring a fraud action, the requisite duty of care to bring a negligence action, 
privity of contract to bring a contract action,
198
 and the reliance necessary to 
be successful in a fraud or negligent representation case.
199
 
 
 196. See Benjamin H. Brownlow, Rating Agency Reform:  Preserving the Registered 
Market for Asset-Backed Securities, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 111 (2011) (recounting 
how Ford Motor Company LLC was unable to find a single NRSRO to provide credit 
ratings for inclusion in their registration statement); Gretchen Morgenson, Hey, S.E.C., The 
Escape Hatch is Still Open, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2001, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06gret.html (noting that the CRAs responded 
to the legislation by not allowing their ratings to be disclosed in asset-backed deals.).   
      197. See Ford Motor Credit Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 2882538, at *1 (Nov. 
23, 2010) (“Pending further notice, the Division will not recommend enforcement action to 
the Commission if an asset-backed issuer . . . omits the ratings disclosure . . . from a 
prospectus.”). 
 198. A problem facing investors bringing claims against CRAs for negligence involves 
the extent to which the CRA owed investors a duty of care.  Similarly, investors suing based 
on breach of contract have faced lack of privity defenses.  In other words, CRAs have 
successfully argued that investors are not in privity of contract with the CRA and that they 
are not intended third-party beneficiaries entitled to sue for breach of any contract.  See, e.g., 
Quinn v. McGraw-Hill, 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999) (contract between issuer and CRA not 
intended to benefit investor); First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 
179 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying recovery for lack of privity, citing that the court did not want to 
expose the organization to claims by the entire general public); Jaillet v. Cashman, 189 
N.Y.S. 743, 744 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (“There is no privity between this plaintiff and the 
defendant.  He is but one of a public to whom all news is liable to be disseminated.”).  
Moreover, courts have denied liability based on negligent misrepresentation finding the 
absence of the requisite “special relationship.”  See generally Murphy, supra note 159, at 
777-79 (discussing the issue of privity).   
 199. See Ellis et al., supra note 12, at 183-84 (discussing the problems associated with 
attaching civil liability to CRAs); see also Quinn v. McGraw-Hill, 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 
1999) (demonstrating that plaintiffs have found it difficult to prove justifiable reliance).  The 
court in Quinn held that investor reliance on the rating was unreasonable, absolving the 
CRA from liability, and relied on boilerplate language warning the investor that the rating 
was not a recommendation to buy or sell.  Id. at 334.  Hence, the court found that these 
statements “should have alerted Quinn to the fact that he was responsible for doing his own 
homework about the risks he was assuming . . . .”  Id. at 336.  Arguably, this is at least in 
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Second, even when plaintiffs are able to prove the prima facie case, 
CRAs have been able to avoid liability by asserting a First Amendment 
privilege.
200
 CRAs have compared themselves to members of the financial 
press and argued that their function is essentially journalistic in nature.  
Terming their ratings “the shortest editorial ever written,”
201
 they have 
argued that ratings opinions on matters of public concern and entitled to the 
First Amendment protection afforded to members of the press.
202
  This First 
Amendment immunity can be overcome only by a showing of actual 
malice.
203
  A number of courts have upheld this argument and the general 
 
part, based on the court’s view that ratings are mere opinions.  See Caleb Deats, Talk that 
Isn’t Cheap:  Does the First Amendment Protect Credit Rating Agencies’ Faulty 
Methodologies from Regulation?, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1818, 1834 (2010) (“If the Court 
expects readers to approach opinions skeptically . . . those who seek to rely on predictive 
opinions likely must demonstrate a similar skepticism.”). But see Murphy, supra note 159, 
at 780-82 (arguing that ratings impact the market and, thus, meet the reliance standard).   
 200.  See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 988 F.Supp. 
1341, 1348 (D. Colo. 1997), aff’d 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999) (discerning that certain 
claims were not provably false and thus immunized by the First Amendemnt.); see also 
Crawford, supra note 164; Freeman, supra note 161; Thomas J. Pate, Triple-A Ratings 
Stench:  May the Credit Rating Agencies be Held Accountable?, 14 BARRY L. REV. 25, 44 
(2010) (“Most of the cases brought against CRAs have failed on the basis of the argument 
that they are members of the press and that their ratings are protected under the heightened 
actual malice standard.”).   
 201.  The phrase “world’s shortest editorial” was coined in a law review note.  Husisian, 
supra note 187, at 446 
 202. See, e.g., Nagy, supra note 4, at 141-42 (“Despite harboring enormous influence in 
all areas of the financial markets, rating agencies have deflected liability for their inaccurate 
ratings by claiming that their core function is journalism – that they serve to gather and 
analyze newsworthy financial information and then disseminate opinions about this 
information to the public.”).  The Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985), explained that the First Amendment creates a privilege 
applicable to “expression on matters not of public concern.”  Whether something is deemed 
to be a matter of public concern “must be determined by the content, form, and context of a 
given statement . . . “ Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).   
 203.  Under the New York Times test, journalists are liable for such false statements only 
if the statements were made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth (i.e., 
actual malice).  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defining actual 
malice as a statement made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”).  The court justified this protection by stating that “erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the ‘breathing’ space that they ‘need to survive.’”  Id., at 271-72; see 
also Murphy, supra note 159, at 776-77 (noting that the New York Times test was designed 
to immunize reporters from defamation claims not claims based on negligence, fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation, i.e., the claims typically asserted against CRAs).  See generally 
Crawford, supra note 165, at 19 (noting that lawsuits against CRAs are often stymied by the 
First Amendemnt); Jonathan W. Heggen, Not Always the World’s Shortest Editorial:  Why 
Credit-Rating-Agency Speech is Sometimes Professional Speech, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 
1755 (2011) (observing that CRAs have used the First Amendment as a tool to protect 
against regulation).  
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expectation is that immunity will be granted.
204
  Therefore, plaintiffs have 
rarely, if ever, been successful in attaching civil liability to CRAs for faulty 
credit ratings. 
Recent case law indicates, however, that CRAs might face some civil 
liability stemming from their actions leading up to the GFC.
205
  The court in 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Int’l Ltd.
206
 rejected 
the First Amendment defense for CRAs.  The case of Cal. Pub. Employees’ 
Ret. Sys. v. Moody’s Investors Serv. Inc.
207
 further illustrates the proposition 
that CRAs might face liability for rating CDOs in the time leading up to the 
GFC.  In that case, Judge Richard Kramer of the Superior Court of the 
State of California concluded that the ratings were not entitled to First 
Amendment protection.
208
  The court quickly concluded that the CRAs 
were “not akin to members of the financial press;”
209
 instead the court 
found the rating activity to be an “economic activity designed for a limited 
target for the purpose of making money.”
210
 
The likelihood of CRAs facing civil liability is unclear.  Moreover, as 
has been outlined above, civil liability differs significantly from criminal 
liability in terms of fulfilling the public policy goals of retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation.  Therefore, the question arises: to what 
extent might criminal liability serve as an effective alternative? 
III. ATTACHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO CRAS: THE CORPORATE 
ETHOS MODEL 
Any discussion of imposing criminal liability upon CRAs necessitates 
some consideration of what crimes, if any, have been violated.  A criminal 
action would likely be based upon either federal mail or wire fraud, federal 
 
 204.  See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 
(1985) (indicating that ratings are opinions and that the first amendment immunity for 
ratings can only be broken by a showing of malice); Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Inv. 
Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & “ERISA” Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Cnty. of Orange v. 
McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999); see also, Arthur R. Pinto, Control and 
Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 353 
(2006) (stating that immunity will be granted where there is no proof of malice).   
 205.  See Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza, supra note 12, at 203-07 (noting that civil liability 
might be imposed on CRAs based on common law).   
 206.  651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
 207.  226 Cal. App. 4th 643 (2014).   
 208. Order Overruling in Part and Sustaining in Part Defendants’ Demurrers to 
Complaint, Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., (Cal. Super. 
Ct. June 1, 2010) (No. CGC-09-490241), available at http://ratingagencylawblog.files. 
wordpress.com/2010/06/calpers-v-moodys.pdf) [Hereinafter CalPers Order].   
 209. Id. at 8. 
 210. Id. 
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securities law, or general fraud under state law.
211
  Regardless of which 
criminal statutes are employed, a prerequisite to finding criminal liability is 
clearing the mens rea hurdle.  In this section, we illustrate application of the 
corporate ethos model to determine whether or not the mens rea 
requirement has been met and compare it to application of the traditional 
respondeat superior model. 
A. Corporate Ethos Model 
Under the corporate ethos model, liability is imposed upon a 
corporation where the corporate culture encouraged the criminal activity.  
Under this model, the corporate culture is defined by its hierarchy (the role 
of the leaders), goals, education and training programs, monitoring 
mechanisms, response to the allegations of criminal behavior, 
compensation incentives, and the breadth of indemnification policies.
212
  In 
this section, we will examine the culture of CRAs, using facts from the 
time period leading up to the GFC as an illustration, and apply the 
corporate ethos model. 
1. Corporate Goals 
A good starting point for examining culture is to look at corporate 
goals.  Each CRA has a statement of corporate goals.  The formal 
statements can be found online.  For example, Moody’s declares that they 
seek “to protect the integrity of the rating process, to ensure that investors 
and issuers are treated fairly, and to safeguard confidential information 
provided to us by issuers.”
213
  More specifically, their Code of Professional 
Conduct states that Moody’s (MIS): 
 
[M]aintains independence in its relationships with Issuers, 
investors, and other interested entities.  MIS does not have a 
fiduciary relationship with the Issuer whose security is being 
rated (or any other party).  Nor does MIS act as an advisor to the 
Issuers it rates.  MIS may comment on the potential credit 
implications of proposed structural elements of a security, but 
 
 211. Maas, supra note 35, at 1023 (“Prosecutors could try to bring a wire fraud case, a 
case for fraudulent violation of SEC regulations, or a more general criminal fraud case at the 
state level.”).   
      212. See infra notes 123-143 and accompanying text. 
 213. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2 (June 2011) 
available at http://www.moodys.com/uploadpage/Mco%20Documents/Documents_ 
professional_conduct.pdf).   
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MIS does not participate in the actual structuring of any security 
under consideration for a Credit Rating [and, that they] will 
invest resources sufficient to carry out high-quality credit 
assessments of Issuers or obligations.  When deciding whether to 
rate or continue rating an obligation or Issuer, MIS will assess 
whether it is able to devote sufficient personnel with appropriate 
skills to make a proper rating assessment, and whether its 
personnel likely will have access to sufficient information needed 
in order to make such an assessment.
214
 
 
Moreover, the Code decrees that “[t]he Credit Rating MIS assigns to 
an Issuer or obligation will not be affected by the existence of, or potential 
for, a business relationship between MIS (or its affiliates) and the Issuer (or 
its affiliates), or any other party, or the non-existence of any such 
relationship.”
215
  Standard & Poor’s and Fitch make similar statements.
216
 
Unfortunately, there is ample evidence that the informal culture was, 
instead, dictated by a drive for revenue.
217
  This became an overriding goal 
of increasing market share.
218
  For example, in 2000 Moody’s head of the 
Structured Finance Group in Paris acknowledged corporate strategy based 
on maximizing “market share and the gross margin with insufficient 
resources.”
219
  A default matrix employed at Standard & Poor’s explicitly 
 
 214. Id. at 6-8.   
 215. Id. at 10.   
 216. Complaint at ¶¶ 143-89, Varga & Longbottom v. McGraw Hill Fin., Inc., (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 11, 2013) (No. 652410/2013), [hereinafter Bear Stearns Complaint] available 
at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/817719/credit-ratings-lawsuit.pdf; see also 
Complaint for Civil Money Penalties at ¶¶ 110-21, United States v. McGraw Hill 
Companies, Inc., (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) (No. CV 13-00779), [hereinafter DOJ complaint] 
(relying on Standard & Poor’s policy against conflicts of interest).   
 217. William J. Harrington, former analyst with Moody’s Derivatives Group identifies 
what he terms the “unchanging corporate credo of maximizing earnings. . . .”  William J. 
Harrington, Comment on SEC Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization 8, available at http://www.sec.gov (2011) [hereinafter Harrington Comment]. 
 218. In a complaint brought by the First National Bank and Trust Company of Rochelle, 
Illinois against the CRAs, this tradeoff is described as a “Faustian bargain with Wall Street 
to prostitute their ratings, independence[,] and reputations in return for unprecedented 
profits.”  First Nat’l Complaint, supra note 170, at 4.  The Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations describes what they term a “major cultural shift” in the corporate culture of 
Moody’s, as Moody’s changed from being conservative in the issuance of ratings to a desire 
to “increas[e] market share and ‘servic[e] the client.’”  Wall Street and The Financial 
Crisis:  Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (2011) [hereinafter Investigations]. 
 219. Investigations, supra note 218, at 274 (citing a 3/19/2000 email from Catherine 
Gerst to Debra Perry, Moody’s Chief Administrative Officer).  An email from Brian 
ELLIS & DOW_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:53 PM 
2014]  ATTACHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO CRAS 215 
 
listed the dual goals of market share and profit.
220
  An internal memo at 
Standard & Poor’s spoke of “an increase in internal management pressures 
to maintain or grow market share while also growing margins.”
221
  An 
analyst at Moody’s related that “[j]ob 1 is to keep the earnings machine 
working.”
222
  Several CRA executives reported “enormous pressure from 
their superiors when their market share dipped.”
223
 
Moreover, the formal culture is described as a culture of 
independence, without conflict of interest, and one in which ratings are 
objectively calculated.  Unfortunately, there is ample evidence that the 
informal culture was, instead, driven by the issuer-pays model, which 
creates an inherent conflict of interest.
224
  Because ninety-five percent of 
annual CRA revenue is from issuer fees, “[t]he result is a system that 
creates strong incentives for the rating agencies to inflate their ratings to 
attract business, and for the issuers and arrangers of the securities to engage 
in ‘ratings shopping’ to obtain the highest ratings for their financial 
products.”
225
  Fees were contingent on the issue of achieving the target 
rating and actually being offered to the public.
226
  These incentives 
 
Clarkson, a senior manager of the Moody’s Structured Finance Real Estate and Derivatives 
Group, further illustrates the focus on market share.  Brian Clarkson’s email states: 
 
The Derivatives team has achieved a year to date 96% market share 
compared to a target share of 95%.  This is down approximately 2% 
from 2002 primarily due to not rating Insurance TRUP CDO’s and 
rating less subordinated tranches.  Noel’s team is considering whether 
we need to refine our approach to these securities.  The CMBS team was 
able to meet their target share of 75%.  However, this was down from 
84% market share in 2002 primarily due to competitor’s [sic] easing 
their standards to capture market share.   
 
Id.  As the Senate Report points out, this email demonstrates a focus on achieving market 
share and “appears silent with regard to issuing accurate ratings.”  Id.; see also Bear Stearns 
Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 195 (referencing an employee email stating “that aspects of 
the firms’ ratings methodology would have to be revisited to recapture market share from 
the competing rating agency.”). 
 220. DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 168.   
 221. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 204.   
 222. Harrington Comment, supra note 217, at 27.   
 223. Investigations, supra note 218, at 276 (quoting Eric Kolchinsky, senior manager at 
Moody’s).   
 224. In 2003, the SEC voiced concerns about the impact of the conflict of interest.  SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 40 n.109 (January 2003) (“[C]oncerns had been 
expressed that a rating agency might be tempted to give a more favorable rating to a large 
issue because of the large fee, and to encourage the issuer to submit future large issues to the 
rating agency.”).   
 225. Investigations, supra note 218, at 273.   
 226. DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 65. 
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encouraged CRAs to rate the issues highly and to assist in marketing the 
product.
227
  Instead of the independence that is touted as a part of the formal 
culture, CRAs worked with the issuers to create derivatives so that they 
could rate issues as high as possible.
228
 
A 2002 Moody’s survey of the Structured Finance Group provides a 
revealing glance into employee perception of the corporate goals and, 
perhaps, into its informal culture.  Those responding to the survey 
described the business objectives as including “generating increased 
revenues; increasing market share; fostering good relationships with issuers 
and investors; and delivering high quality ratings and research.”
229
  More 
telling, “[w]hen asked about how business objectives were translated into 
day-to-day work, most agreed that writing deals was paramount, while 
writing research and developing new products and services received less 
emphasis.”
230
 Moreover, many cited the importance of building 
relationships with issuers and investment bankers.
231
  The focus on client 
relationships was problematic because clients were pressuring CRAs to 
ease rating standards and at the same time shopping their ratings among 
CRAs to obtain the rating desired.
232
 
There is evidence that employees responded to this pressure in the 
way we might expect.  Recall, psychology literature informs us that 
individuals are basically obedient and will engage in goal-driven behavior, 
e.g., will work to achieve goals by whatever means.
233
  Therefore, it is not 
surprising to hear a Standard & Poor’s Managing Director state, “I knew it 
was wrong at the time . . . . It was either that or skip the business.  That 
wasn’t my mandate.  My mandate was to find a way.  Find the way.”
234
  
Hence, it is clear that while the formal statement of corporate goals 
 
 227. CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 48.   
 228. See e.g., Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 298 (noting how a S & P 
analyst described the process by which he manipulated the data to improve the rating); 
Investigations, supra note 218, at 250-54 (describing the rating process including the role 
that CRAs had in structuring the produce and credit enhancements required for the AAA 
rating).  Brian Clarkson, former Chief Operating Officer at Moody’s has been quoted as 
describing this process as one where “[y]ou start with a rating and build a deal around a 
rating.”  CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 47. 
 229. Investigations, supra note 218, at 274. 
 230. Investigations, supra note 218, at 274.  
 231. Investigations, supra note 218, at 274.   
 232. Investigations, supra note 218, at 278 (reporting that investment banks were 
pressuring CRA analysts to “ease rating standards.”).  Further, there is evidence that ratings 
shopping was a common occurrence.  Investigations, supra note 218, at 287 (“Moody’s 
Chief Credit Officer told the Subcommittee staff that ratings shopping, the practice in which 
investment banks chose the credit rating agency offering the highest rating for a proposed 
transaction, was commonplace prior to 2008.”).   
      233. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 234. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 199. 
ELLIS & DOW_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:53 PM 
2014]  ATTACHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO CRAS 217 
 
emphasized accuracy and integrity of ratings, the informal culture was 
driven by a need to obtain larger market share and increased revenues for 
the firms.  There is evidence that the overriding goal of growing market 
share lead CRAs to issue favorable ratings and to adjust the models used to 
guarantee favorable ratings and attract business.
235
  In spite of the fact that 
CRAs knew that the assumptions and facts used in their models were 
flawed and that the ratings assigned to CDOs were likely inaccurate, 
overrating securities and underestimating risk,
236
 the pressures to grow 
market share induced them to continue unchanged.  In fact, there is 
evidence that the failure to update or revise these models was based on a 
desire to maintain market share.
237
  CRA management made clear that 
when accuracy of ratings conflicted with obtaining business, the choice was 
 
 235. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 208 (quoting an email from Richard 
Gugliada, Managing Director at Standard & Poor’s, in which he discussed scheduling a 
meeting to explore “adjusting criteria for rating CDOs of real estate assets this week because 
of the ongoing threat of losing deals.”).  Richard Gugliada admitted that Standard & Poor’s 
repeatedly eased its rating standards in “a market-share war where criteria were relaxed.”  
Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 208; see also DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, 
at ¶ 176 (quoting senior analyst at Standard & Poor’s, acknowledging the tradeoffs between 
market share and accurate ratings:  “So how do we balance these risks and rewards to 
achieve our business objectives?  For example, if our objectives were solely based on 
market share, then one solution might be to create a different, more ‘favourable’ [sic] model 
for each type of transaction.”). 
 236. Investigations, supra note 218, at 276 (“Despite the internal recognition at Moody’s 
that previously rated CDOs were at substantial risk for downgrades, the email shows 
management pressing the CDO Managing Directors about losing a few points of market 
share in the middle of an accelerating ratings disaster.”); see also DOJ complaint, supra note 
216, at ¶¶ 123-24 (outlining how Standard & Poor’s failed repeatedly to account for known 
credit risks consciously deciding to favor issuers and grow market share and profits); Bear 
Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 314 (quoting Standard and Poor’s Director Frank 
Parisi, acknowledging that their rating models were only “marginally more accurate than ‘if 
you just simply flipped a coin.’”). 
 237. See Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 205 (discussing a document 
circulated at Standard & Poor’s requiring any new ratings proposals to include an 
explanation of “market perception and reaction.”); DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶¶ 
138-57 (discussing Standard & Poor’s refusal to adopt the LEVELS 6.0 model because it 
would result in higher loss coverage levels); DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 296 (“Put 
simply, it was not profitable to update these models, so S&P purposely refrained from doing 
so.”); DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 306 (quoting the statement of Richard Gugliada 
in a deposition in which he acknowledged that the decision to delay implementation of a 
new model was due to “concerns to be competitive and preserve market penetration.”); see 
also DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 277 (in which a Standard and Poor’s employee 
admits that the ratings model is insufficient but used anyway); DOJ Complaint, supra note 
216, at ¶ 288 (“Version 6.0 could’ve been released months ago and resources assigned 
elsewhere if we didn’t have to massage the sub-prime and Alt-A numbers to preserve 
market share . . . .”); DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶¶ 160-80 (discussing Standard & 
Poor’s failure to update the CDO Evaluator).  
ELLIS & DOW_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:53 PM 
218 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
to sacrifice ratings in response to the “ongoing threat of losing deals.”
238
  In 
fact, the Report by the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
concluded that “[i]t was not in the short term economic self interest of 
either Moody’s or S&P to provide accurate credit ratings for high risk 
RMBS and CDO securities, because doing so would have hurt their own 
revenues.”
239
  A Moody’s managing director acknowledged the lure of 
profits when he outlined the errors made and concluded that, “[c]ombined, 
these errors make us look either incompetent at credit analysis, or like we 
sold our soul to the devil for revenue, or a little bit of both.”
240
 
Meeting these goals was very lucrative for the CRA firm.  In fact, the 
earnings for structured finance instruments were estimated at three times 
the fees assessed for rating corporate bonds.
241
  Fees of up to $150,000 for 
each non-prime MBS rated were not uncommon, with fees of $500,000 for 
cash CDOs and for up to $750,000 for each synthetic CDO rated.
242
  In 
some cases, the fees could be as high as $1 million for rating a derivative 
(on top of what earned for rating underlying assets).
243
  Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s received a record amount of revenues for rating 
structured finance products from 2004 to 2007.
244
  For example, in 2007, 
53% of Moody’s revenue was from structured finance.
245
 
2. Attention to hierarchy (the role of the leaders) 
Social science supports the conclusion that behavior by upper 
 
 238. Investigations, supra note 218, at 276 (citing an email from S & P management; the 
email continued, “We are meeting with your group this week to discuss adjusting criteria for 
rating CDOs of real estate assets this week because of the ongoing threat of losing deals.”).   
 239. Investigations, supra note 218, at 244.  In fact, “[m]ultiple former Moody’s and 
S&P employees told the Subcommittee that, in the years leading up to the financial crisis, 
gaining market share, increasing revenues, and pleasing investment bankers bringing 
business to the firm assumed a higher priority than issuing accurate . . . ratings.”  
Investigations, supra note 218, at 273. 
 240. Investigations, supra note 218, at 245; Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 
1.   
 241. CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 41. 
 242. DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶¶ 62-63. 
 243. CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 42.  The $250,000 charged to rate a $350 
million mortgage pool can be contrasted with the $50,000 in fees garnered for rating an 
equivalent-size bond.  CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 43.   
 244. Investigations, supra note 218, at 30.  For example, over the five year period 
preceding the GFC, the gross revenues Moody’s received from rating CDOs more than 
tripled, going from $61 million in 2002 to over $260 million in 2006.  Investigations, supra 
note 218, at 30-31.  S&P reports similar jumps in revenue.  Investigations, supra note 218, 
at 30.  In total, the revenues received by the three leading CRAs more than doubled during 
this period.  Investigations, supra note 218, at 31. 
 245. CalPers Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 43. 
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management is a powerful force in creating corporate culture.  As such, the 
leader has the capacity to foster virtue in firm employees and, by doing so, 
encourage ethical and legal behavior.  The leader can work to establish a 
culture in which individuals are respected and nurtured, thereby fostering 
virtue, or one in which individuals are treated badly.
246
  There is evidence 
that CRA leaders fostered a culture of harassment and intimidation.  
William J. Harrington, former analyst with Moody’s Derivatives Group, 
described how Moody’s leadership “maneuvered for a prescribed result 
through intimidation of other voting members.  Intimidation could be 
blatant, with managers belittling opposing views, interrupting while others 
speak . . . .” 
247
  There is evidence that CRA upper management routinely 
pressured analysts to issue pre-determined ratings influenced by 
management’s desire to increase revenues and stock price.  For example, 
there are reports that Brian Clarkson, a former senior executive at Moody’s, 
“used fear and intimidation tactics” to encourage analysts to spend less 
time rating securities and more time working with investment bankers.
248
  
This pressure translated into a “radical change in Moody’s analytical 
culture that not only changed the rating process, but also profoundly 
changed Moody’s ratings.”
249
  Leaders can foster virtue by acting as role 
models and coaches of virtuous behavior; the leader can foster virtue by 
recognizing and rewarding virtuous behavior and by punishing unethical 
and illegal behavior.
250
 Unfortunately, CRA leadership, at best, ignored 
unethical behavior and, at worse, encouraged illegal behavior.  When CRA 
leaders were informed of concerns about rating accuracy as the housing 
market deteriorated, they did nothing.  For example, in February 2007, 
Frank Parisi, Standard & Poor’s director, informed senior management that 
losses in 2006 could be as much as two times the losses for 2000.
251
  
However, no action was taken to revise loss estimates.
252
  This lack of 
 
 246. See Kennedy, supra note 114, at 14 (discussing the importance of “attend[ing] to 
the culture of the workplace” as an important factor in fostering the development of virtue in 
firm employees).   
 247. Harrington Comment, supra note 217, at 14-15.   
 248. Investigations, supra note 218, at 274 (relying on a statement by Mark Froeba, 
Moody’s former Senior Vice President).   
 249. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 235.   
 250.  Kennedy, supra note 114, at 14.  
 251.  Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 273.   
 252.  Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 273.  When a Standard & Poor’s 
executive objected to new criteria procedures, his concerns were ignored.  DOJ Complaint, 
supra note 216, at ¶ 126 (quoting an executive who asked, “Does this mean we are to review 
our proposed criteria changes with investors, issuers and investment bankers?”).  Jerome 
Fons tells a similar story at Moody’s.  Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 362 
(“The deterioration in standards was probable . . . . [E]vidence first arose at least in 2006 
that things were slipping, and the analysts or the managers for whatever reason turned a 
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action was an important factor in creating an informal culture that focused 
on achieving the goal of market share and increased revenue at all costs.
253
  
When an employee questions unethical or illegal behavior and senior 
management turns a blind eye, this tells employees that such behavior is 
sanctioned. 
3. Compensation incentives 
An examination of the rewards and incentives of an organization is 
crucial to defining the informal culture.  Psychology research teaches us 
that people will act in ways that are rewarded and will act to avoid 
punishment.  Moreover, people will watch how others are rewarded and 
punished and that will guide individual behavior.  At the CRAs, 
compliance with pressures to increase market share was rewarded; non-
compliance was punished.
254
 Top CRA executives were rewarded 
handsomely for performance.  For example, Moody’s CEO Raymond W. 
McDaniel Jr., earned more than $8 million in compensation in 2006; in the 
same year the head of the structured finance group earned $3.8 million.
255
  
Upper and middle management also received massive compensation 
packages.  For example, Moody’s managing directors made from almost 
$700,000 to over $930,000 including stock options.
256
  There is evidence 
that lower level employees were also driven to act by the potential for 
rewards.  One employee is quoted as saying, “[l]et’s hope we are all 
wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters.”
257
  In Moody’s 
2006 Business Effectiveness Survey, a Moody employee noted, 
“[i]ndividuals are being promoted/rewarded who do not read the documents 
 
blind eye to this, did not update their models or their thinking[,] and allowed this to go 
on.”). 
 253. One analyst questioned the loosening of assumptions in a model and asked, “who 
was the genius who came up with this[?]”  The reply was, “I am interested to see if any 
career consequences occur.  Does the company care about deal volume or sound credit 
standards?”  DOJ Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 187.  The non-action by leadership and 
the lack of punishment answered that question.  Mark Froeba, Moody’s former Senior Vice 
President revealed, “Moody’s managers deliberately engineered a change to its culture to 
ensure that rating analysis never jeopardized market share and revenue.  They accomplished 
this both by rewarding those who collaborated and punishing those who resisted.”  Bear 
Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 236. 
 254. See generally Harrington Comment, supra note 217 (noting that analysts were 
given harsh reviews for challenging management while those in compliance were 
rewarded).  
      255. Investigations, supra note 218, at  258. 
 256. Investigations, supra note 218, at 258-59.  William J. Harrington opines that 
awarding stock options exacerbated the conflicts of interest and “seduced” employees at all 
levels.  Harrington Comment, supra note 217, at 12. 
 257. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 1.  
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and do not truly analyze the documents.  They simply convey what the 
bankers tell them.”
258
 
By contrast, not meeting corporate performance goals could be fatal.  
Several Moody’s employees have testified about these pressures.  Senior 
analyst Richard Michalek describes a meeting with his boss as follows: 
 
The conversation was quite uncomfortable, and it didn’t improve 
when he described how he had previously had to fire [another 
analyst], a former leader of the Asset-Backed group who he 
otherwise considered a ‘good guy.’  He described how, because 
of the numerous complaints he had received about [that analyst’s] 
extreme conservatism, rigidity and insensitivity to client 
perspective, he was left with no choice. . . . He then asked me to 
convince him why he shouldn’t fire me. . . . [T]he primary 
message of the conversation was plain: further complaints from 
the ‘customers’ would very likely abruptly end my career at 
Moody’s.
259
 
 
Another analyst testified that, “the fear was real, not rare and not at all 
healthy. You began to hear of analysts, even whole groups of analysts, at 
Moody’s who had lost their jobs because they were doing their jobs, 
identifying risks and describing them accurately.” 
260
 
4. Education and training programs 
There is little evidence of the existence of education and training 
programs in CRAs.  What is apparent, however, is that CRAs failed to 
 
 258. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 223. 
 259. Investigations, supra note 218, at 275.  Another example in the Senate Report 
includes a statement by Eric Kolchinsky from Moody’s who said that, “[m]anagers of rating 
groups were expected by their supervisors and ultimately the Board of Directors of Moody’s 
to build, or at least maintain, market share.  It was an unspoken understanding that loss of 
market share would cause a manager to lose his or her job.”  Investigations, supra note 218, 
at 275. 
 260. Investigations, supra note 218, at 275 (quoting Mark Froeba).  Mark Froeba 
explained that Moody’s former President and COO “used fear and threats of termination to 
encourage analysts to work more cooperatively with investment bankers at the expense of 
ratings quality.”  Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 226.  Mark Froeba also 
testified, “When I left Moody’s [in 2007], an analyst’s worst fear was that he would do 
something that would allow him to be singled out for jeopardizing Moody’s market share, 
for impairing Moody’s revenue, or for damaging Moody’s relationships with its clients, and 
lose his job as a result.”  Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 236; see also 
Harrington Comment, supra note 217, at 17 (“Management also explicitly threatened the job 
security of analysts who ‘impeded deals’ . . . .”). 
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maintain enough trained personnel to conduct quality ratings assessments.  
The lack of a sufficient number of trained analysts affected ratings quality 
and CRA leadership was aware of this issue.
261
  Moreover, as the housing 
market began deteriorating, it became clear that some modification to 
existing models should be adopted and CRA personnel should conduct 
surveillance of mortgage performance.
262
 Unfortunately, CRAs were 
insufficiently staffed to conduct adequate surveillance, and no changes 
were made.
263
  Moody’s employees noted that “[t]his is not a recipe for 
ethical behavior,”
264
 yet nothing changed.  Again, this is an important 
aspect of informal culture.  At a time where the formal culture touted 
accuracy of ratings as paramount, CRA staff was so inadequate that 
accurate ratings were impossible.  The fact that management was aware of 
this and refused to address it because it would impact revenue speaks to the 
primacy of the revenue goal. 
The last three factors that are relevant under the corporate ethos model 
are 5) the monitoring mechanisms in place, 6) how the corporation 
responded to the allegations of criminal behavior, and 7) the breadth of 
their indemnification policies. 
Collectively, these require a consideration of the extent to which the 
corporation tacitly encouraged the illegal behavior at issue.  In other words, 
was the behavior recklessly tolerated?  One important factor in creating 
corporate culture is how the organization, in particular its leaders, responds 
to allegations of misconduct.  There is evidence that the manipulation of 
ratings was condoned if not actively encouraged.  For example, one 
Standard and Poor’s employee describes how he manipulated the payment 
dates inputted into the ratings model in an attempt to justify high ratings.
265
  
Rather than being punished or warned against such behavior, he reports the 
response of a senior director as, “I don’t think this is enough to satisfy 
them.  What’s the next step?”
266
 
One vehicle for insuring proper behavior within a corporation is a 
 
 261. Moody’s Structured Finance Group Survey in 2002 revealed that, “[t]here [was] 
some concern about workload and its impact on operating effectiveness . . . . Most 
acknowledge that Moody’s intends to run lean, but there is some question of whether 
effectiveness is compromised by the current deployment of the staff.”  Bear Stearns 
Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 239.   
      262. See Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at  ¶ 325. 
  263. See Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 325 (“Despite this clear concern, 
S&P did not take action to bolster its surveillance capabilities – making its ratings 
increasingly inaccurate.”).  In fact, Moody’s had only twenty-six surveillance analysts 
responsible for tracking over 13,000 rated CDOs.  Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, 
at ¶ 357.   
 264. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 359. 
  265. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 298. 
 266. Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 298.  
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compliance department. Unfortunately, there is evidence that CRA 
compliance departments were more concerned with insuring behavior that 
was consistent with the overriding goal of increasing market share than 
with accurate ratings.  For example, in an August 8, 2011 letter to the SEC, 
William J. Harrington, an analyst at Moody’s Derivatives Group wrote, 
“[t]he Compliance Department is also an enforcer that actively harasses 
analysts viewed as ‘troublesome,’i.e. independent, and is well-experienced 
in doing so.”
267
 
Under the corporate ethos model, corporate criminal liability is 
appropriate if the government can prove that the corporate ethos or 
corporate culture encouraged corporate employees to engage in 
wrongdoing.  In this section, we have outlined facts that tell the story of a 
misaligned corporate culture.  The formal culture is described as one that 
values the importance of reputational capital, public trust and accurate 
ratings.  The informal culture, however, is one in which the overriding 
goals of revenue and market share rule.  We see examples of individuals 
conforming to the revenue mantra, operating under confirmation bias as 
they rely on unreasonable assumptions without question.
268
  We see 
examples of individuals driven by a culture that rewards only actions that 
increase revenue and market share and punishes any behavior that 
negatively impacts revenue.  We see a culture defined by leadership that 
favorably acknowledges only behavior that leads to revenue growth and 
actively seeks to punish honest analysts who question inaccurate models 
and ratings that are based on unrealistic assumptions.
269
 
B. Respondeat Superior Model 
As we have demonstrated, prosecutors would be able to overcome the 
mens rea hurdle using the corporate ethos model proposed.  By contrast, it 
seems unlikely that they would be able to establish the requisite mens rea 
using the traditional model of respondeat superior.  Recall that under 
respondeat superior, the prosecutor must demonstrate that an employee 
 
 267. Harrington Comment, supra note 217, at 9.   
 268. See, e.g., Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 351 (explaining that 
Moody’s employed a model that assumed that housing prices would increase four percent 
each year for forty-five years).  How could this happen?  A member of Moody’s senior 
management suggests the answer might be confirmation bias, opining, “it seems to me that 
we had blinders on and never questioned the information we were given.”  Bear Stearns 
Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 365.   
 269. See, e.g., Bear Stearns Complaint, supra note 216, at ¶ 236 (“Moody’s senior 
managers never set out to make sure that Moody’s rating answers were always wrong.  
Instead, they put in place a new culture that would not tolerate for long any answer that hurt 
Moody’s bottom line.”).   
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committed a crime within the scope of his or her employment and intended 
to at least, in part, benefit the corporation.  The problem is that a single 
individual who committed a criminal act with the requisite intent must be 
identified.
270
  Applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to the facts 
outlined above illustrates a major criticism of this model: under-
inclusiveness.  While we have demonstrated that the corporate culture 
created the situation that led individuals within that organization to engage 
in conduct to benefit the corporation, it is unlikely that any single 
individual could be identified.  Moreover, it seems unlikely that the actions 
of any single individual were criminal.  It is only when those actions are 
aggregated that we see a criminal act.  In other words, if a single analyst 
responds to pressures created by the culture (e.g., he attempts to achieve 
organizational goals without question and does so in part to earn a 
favorable evaluation and rewards), that alone is not criminal.  It is only 
when coupled with every other analyst engaging in similar behavior that we 
have a pattern of inaccurate ratings and criminal conduct by the 
corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many arguments against imposing corporate criminal 
liability from a public policy standpoint.  Arguably, the philosophies 
underlying criminal law are inapplicable to the corporation.  To the extent 
that criminal sanctions are imposed against people who have committed 
morally reprehensible acts, imposing similar sanctions on a corporation 
makes no sense.  Moreover, it has been argued that, “no matter what fiction 
we employ, a corporation has no intent.”
271
  We believe, however, that the 
imposition of criminal sanctions upon a corporation can serve valid public 
policy objectives.  Any other conclusion ignores the important role that 
corporations play in today’s economy.
272
  Importantly, in many cases the 
threat of criminal sanctions is necessary to induce needed changes and to 
 
 270. See Maas, supra note 35, at 1023 (arguing that it would be difficult to identify any 
one analyst whose behavior would meet the scienter requirement).   
 271. Bucy, supra note 22, at 1288. 
 272. See Beale, supra note 22, at 1482 (“[I]mposing criminal liability on corporations 
makes sense, because corporations . . . are very real and enormously powerful actors whose 
conduct often causes very significant harm both to individuals and to society as a whole.”); 
Bucy, supra note 22, at 1288 (“The major argument in favor of prosecuting corporations is 
as follows: corporations are major actors in today’s world; the criminal law is the most 
effective method of influencing behavior by rational actors; therefore, criminal prosecution 
is the most effective way to influence corporate actors.”); Bucy, supra note 42, at 1437 
(“Any societal actor that engages in such wide-ranging and potentially harmful activities 
should be subject to criminal prosecution since it is the most potent regulatory mechanism 
society possesses.”). 
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protect the public.  The actions of CRAs in the years leading up to the GFC 
serve as useful examples. 
There is no doubt that CRA behavior was an important contributing 
factor to the GFC.  Had CRAs properly rated the complex derivatives, they 
could have stopped the bubble.  Instead, motivated in large part by the huge 
commissions they received, they mis-rated the CDOs, provided incentives 
for mortgage originators to offer increasingly risky mortgages and fueled 
the bubble.  At the time, they were subject to minimal regulation, and the 
threat of civil liability was almost non-existent.  Little has changed since 
the GFC.  Dodd-Frank imposed civil liability, but the SEC suspended that 
section.  It is possible that CRAs could still avoid any civil liability using 
the First Amendment as a shield.  In other words, civil liability and 
administrative regulation have proven to be ineffective in regulating CRA 
behavior. 
We believe that the threat of criminal sanctions is needed to provide 
sufficient incentives to modify CRA behavior.
273
  We recognize that 
imposition of criminal sanctions can have severe consequences for 
corporations.  Arthur Andersen was forced out of business as a result of 
their conviction; British Petroleum has faced debarment because of their 
guilty plea.  To some extent, that is the point.  Sanctions for engaging in 
criminal behavior should have severe consequences.  Imposition of 
criminal sanctions can carry severe consequences for individuals also, but 
that does not lead us to conclude that such sanctions are ill advised.  In the 
case of CRAs, the very minimal threat of civil liability is ineffective in 
controlling corporate behavior, especially when the potential rewards are so 
great.  We have seen CRA profits rise astronomically since the adoption of 
the issuer-pays model; we have seen the percentage of those profits 
attributed to creating and rating complex derivatives rise dramatically.  The 
potential rewards are too great; the danger of civil liability is too small. 
By contrast, there is reason to believe that the threat of criminal 
sanctions will operate as an effective deterrent.  There is evidence that such 
threats can be highly effective.
274
  As part of a standard cost-benefit 
analysis, corporate executives will assess the inherent risks in allowing 
corporate crime and take actions to avoid such behavior.
275
 
Moreover, we believe that such criminal sanctions can and should be 
 
 273. See Mayer, Baird & Cava, supra note 92, at 2 (arguing that imposition of criminal 
liability would act not only to deter fraudulent activities in the financial sector but also 
“would help to reestablish the basic social contract between business and society.”). 
 274. See Bucy, supra note 42, at 1438 (positing that “corporate actors are highly 
deterable.”) (footnote omitted).   
 275. See Bucy, supra note 42, at 1438 (“Most corporate leaders make decisions based, in 
part, upon their best assessment of whether they (or their company) might be prosecuted if 
their company undertakes certain actions.”).   
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imposed under a corporate ethos model only where the corporate culture 
encouraged and rewarded the criminal behavior.  By using a corporate 
ethos theory of liability against the corporation rather than against a single 
individual, the focus would switch to the organization and away from the 
individual.  Thus, the advantage of using the corporate ethos model is that 
it focuses on the corporate culture in its entirety (the bad barrel), rather than 
singling out a specific individual engaged in wrongdoing (the bad apple), 
even if the actions of that individual are imputed to the corporation.  We 
believe that imposition of criminal sanctions on CRAs under the corporate 
ethos model will best meet the rehabilitative function of criminal law and 
provide important deterrent incentives that will encourage attention to 
corporate culture. 
 
 
 
 
